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 1 
‘Graduated Response’ à l’Anglaise: Online Copyright Infringement and the 
Digital Economy Act 2010 
 
 
Anne Barron  
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the formation of the first New Labour administration in 1997, the ‘creative 
industries’ have moved ever closer to the centre of economic policy-making in the 
UK.
1
 In a context of intense and rising global competition for jobs, tax revenues and 
export earnings, and the long-term decline of high-volume domestic manufacturing, 
UK policy-makers have increasingly looked to cognitive and cultural labour as major 
sources of value for the nation’s economy, and have identified intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) as crucial legal instruments for capturing that value. There is no shortage 
of scepticism as to whether this strategy could be other than a recipe for legitimising 
corporate enclosures that diminish the intellectual common, hastening a 
commercialisation of the arts and culture that will ultimately prove to be self-
defeating, and glamorising the precarious and poorly rewarded forms of employment 
that are endemic within this sector.
2
 Yet there is also no sign that the current 
preoccupation with fostering “the growing success story that is Britain’s creative 
economy”3 is on the wane: it emerged with renewed vigour from the Blair-Brown 
Prime Ministerial handover in 2007, and survived the change of Government from 
New Labour to the Conservative-led coalition in May 2010.
4
  
 
Nonetheless, over the years since 1997, the headline emphasis has shifted from the 
economic potential of cultural creativity to the manner in which IT-related innovation 
– as well as generating valuable products and services in itself – could enable UK-
produced cultural content to be more effectively exploited at home and abroad.
5
 In 
2008-9, the Labour Government produced a strategy, entitled Digital Britain, for what 
it now called the UK’s ‘digital’ economy.6 The premise of the strategy was that the 
digital economy included both the information and communications technology (ICT) 
                                                 
1
 One of the key documents exemplifying this trend, co-produced by the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (hereinafter DCMS), the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(hereinafter BERR) and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (hereinafter BIS), defines 
the ‘creative industries’ to include advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, 
designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and 
computer services, television and radio (DCMS/BERR/BIS, Creative Britain: New Talents for a New 
Economy (February 2008) (hereinafter Creative Britain). 
2
 See e.g. David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker, Creative Labour: Media Work in Three Cultural 
Industries (London: Routledge, 2010). 
3
 Creative Britain p.4. 
4
 See e.g. BIS/DCMS, “Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and 
Growth” (3 August 2011). 
5
 Nicholas Garnham, “From Cultural to Creative Industries” (2005) 11(1) International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 15-29. 
6
 BERR/DCMS, Digital Britain: Interim Report (London: TSO, 2009) (Cm. 7548); BIS/DCMS, 
Digital Britain: Final Report (London: TSO, 2009) (Cm. 7650). 
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 2 
sector (producing computing and communications equipment and applications) and 
the ‘digital content’ sector (producing digitised cultural and informational goods other 
than software); and that overall it accounted for 10% of UK GDP and 6% of total UK 
employment.
7
 Digital Britain was oriented towards ensuring that the UK cultural, 
media and communications industries could seize the opportunities and manage the 
risks posed by digital ICTs. Its action plan included modernising and upgrading the 
UK’s digital communications infrastructure (in particular the mobile network 
spectrum and digital radio); providing a favourable climate for investment and 
innovation in digital content, applications and services; enabling wider participation 
in the digital economy by moving towards universal access to broadband and 
developing the nation’s ‘digital skills’; and delivering more public services online.  
 
The Digital Economy Bill, introduced in the House of Lords on 19 November 2009, 
was intended to take forward several of the recommendations in the Digital Britain 
programme that required legislation, but its most controversial provisions related to 
the use of copyright works online. As originally drafted, these provisions were 
intended to achieve two goals. The first was to facilitate the further development of 
markets in digitised content by lowering the transaction costs involved in obtaining 
licences to use and distribute copyright material. This in turn was to be achieved in 
two main ways: by making provision for ‘extended’ collective licensing (extending 
the powers of collective licensing bodies to works in respect of which their members 
have no rights), and by making provision for the grant of licences in respect of so-
called ‘orphan works’ (copyright material for which no owner can be found after a 
diligent search). Whereas these measures were supposed to benefit users of copyright 
material, the second goal of the copyright-related provisions in the Bill was to make it 
easier for right-holders to enforce their rights in the online environment. This was to 
be achieved primarily by enlisting Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the project of 
curbing mass online copyright infringement, for example by means of the peer-to-peer 
(P2P) file-sharing networks that the UK copyright industries
8
 claim cost them in 
excess of £400 million per annum in lost sales.
9
 Summarising its ambitions for the 
Bill’s copyright provisions, the Government declared: 
 
We want a framework for copyright and performers’ rights that reflects the 
needs of the digital age, and gives the UK’s creative industries the chance to 
develop new legitimate digital products delivered in the way people want, at a 
price that is fair. That means we need to make doing business easier in this 
area, and to significantly reduce the amount of online infringement of 
copyright.
10
  
 
                                                 
7
 The term ‘digital economy’ was nowhere defined in either of the reports in which the Digital Britain 
strategy was explained. A brief explanation of the working assumptions underlying both reports can be 
found in BIS/DCMS, Digital Economy Act: Impact Assessments (April 2010), pp.10-12.  
8
 These are industries that to a large extent depend for their profitability on copyright – or more 
generally, on mechanisms for controlling the replication or repetition of their goods or services. They 
include the film, TV, music, videogame, software and publishing industries. 
9
 BIS/DCMS, Digital Economy Act: Impact Assessments p.64.  See also British Phonographic Industry, 
Digital Music Nation 2010: The UK’s Legal and Illegal Digital Music Landscape. 
10
 BIS/DCMS, “Copyright: Factsheet” (November 2009). 
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 3 
In the face of considerable opposition, the provisions on extended copyright licensing 
and orphan works were dropped from the Bill before it became law on 8 April 2010,
11
 
although the issues these provisions were designed to address have since been 
revisited in a major report on the impact of IPRs on innovation and economic growth, 
commissioned by the Prime Minister in November 2010 and chaired by Ian 
Hargreaves, Professor of Digital Economy at Cardiff University.
12
 The Hargreaves 
Report, published in May 2011, recommended that the Government facilitate the 
establishment of a ‘Digital Copyright Exchange’: a network of interoperable 
databases of digitised copyright content, providing reliable information about rights 
ownership and serving as a one-stop-shop for digital rights clearance; it also urged 
Government to bring forward new legislation providing for extended collective 
licensing and the licensing of orphan works.
13
 By way of a further acknowledgement 
of the economic case for freeing up the use of copyright material, and echoing the 
equally wide-ranging Gowers Report on IPRs (2006),
14
 Hargreaves in addition 
proposed some new limits on copyright: the Report recommended ‘modernisation’ of 
the array of excepted uses provided for by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 (c.48) (hereinafter CDPA), to “reduce transaction costs and stimulate new works 
in growing sectors of the creative economy.”15 In its response to Hargreaves in 
August 2011, the coalition Government accepted these recommendations, indicating 
that it would aim to ensure that a Digital Copyright Exchange was in place by the end 
of 2012, and would soon bring forward proposals for an orphan works scheme, 
extended collective licensing and new copyright exceptions.
16
 
 
Meanwhile, whereas the Digital Economy Bill’s online copyright infringement 
provisions survived largely intact to become sections 3-18 of the Digital Economy 
Act 2010 (c.20) (hereinafter DEA),
17
 developments since the Bill’s enactment have 
                                                 
11
 The campaign against these provisions was largely driven by professional photographers, concerned 
to retain their ability to control the use of their images. For a comprehensive summary of the 
campaigners’ objections to the licensing provisions, see 
http://www.stop43.org.uk/pages/pages/read_more.html. 
12
 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (UK Intellectual 
Property Office, May 2011) (hereinafter Hargreaves Report). 
13
 Ibid, Ch. 4. The goal of these measures would be an efficient digital copyright licensing system, 
where nothing is unusable because the rights owner cannot be found (ibid, p.7). 
14
 The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (London: HMSO, 2006). 
15
 Hargreaves Report, para. 5.37. The new or extended exceptions should, it was urged, cover ‘format-
shifting’ by consumers (transferring e.g. music purchased on CD to other formats so that it can be 
played on multiple devices), a wider array of uses for the purposes of library archiving and non-
commercial research, and uses of copyright material in parodies (ibid Ch. 5). 
16
 BIS/DCMS, “Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and Growth.” 
17
 The other copyright-related measures to survive in the DEA were sections 42 and 43. Section 42 
amends the CDPA to equalise the criminal penalties for digital and non-digital infringement of 
copyright and performers’ property rights, and increase the maximum financial penalty that can be 
imposed on summary conviction of some criminal offences to £50,000. “This is in recognition of the 
importance of having penalties that are proportionate to the harm caused to UK [creative] industries 
and which are effective deterrents against infringement” (BIS/DCMA, “Copyright: Factsheet”). Section 
43 amends the Public Lending Right Act 1979 to include books in non-print formats (audio books and 
e-books) in the public lending right scheme, and amends the CDPA to exempt libraries from copyright 
infringement liability for ‘lending’ books in non-print formats, thereby removing the need for libraries 
to negotiate for licences with individual publishers. This “responds to and reflects the changing nature 
of book publishing and the increasing demand for the loan of books in formats other than print” 
(BIS/DCMS, “Public Lending Right: Factsheet” (November 2009) available at: 
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 4 
done little to inspire confidence in their likely efficacy. Sections 17-18 DEA pave the 
way for court orders requiring ISPs to prevent infringing activity before it can occur – 
by disrupting, or blocking altogether, data traffic to and from particular sites (e.g. 
thePirateBay.org) that are considered to be hubs for infringing activity. Section 17 
gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations enabling courts to grant such 
‘blocking injunctions’ at the request of right-holders, but questions would clearly arise 
as to the compatibility of any such regulations with prevailing EU and domestic rules 
on freedom of expression, privacy, data protection and the interception of 
communications. Following advice from OFCOM (the UK’s media and 
communications regulator),
18
 the coalition Government decided in August 2011 not to 
bring forward site-blocking regulations at present on the ground that the framework 
set up by sections 17-18 DEA was not apt to deliver the outcomes sought by right-
holders.
19
 The focus of what follows, therefore, is on sections 3-16 DEA, which 
together institute a new framework for regulating online copyright infringement by 
end-users of broadband services.  
 
Sections 3-16 lay the foundations for the imposition of new obligations on ISPs 
providing broadband services (referred to here as Internet Access Providers, or IAPs) 
to police their subscribers’ online activities. First, these sections enable IAPs to be 
required to notify subscribers when their broadband accounts are alleged by right-
holders to have been used to infringe copyright, and to keep records of those 
subscribers who have received numerous warnings so that right-holders can take 
targeted legal action against alleged persistent infringers. The Act refers to these as 
the ‘initial obligations’, but provides that they only have legal effect when an ‘initial 
obligations code’ – made and/or approved by OFCOM with the consent of the 
relevant Secretary of State
20
 and setting out in detail how the obligations must be met 
– is in force. Second, if the initial obligations fail to curb online infringement 
                                                                                                                                            
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100511084737/http://interactive.bis.gov.uk/digitalbritain/
2009/12/public-lending-right/). 
18
 OFCOM, “Site-Blocking’ to Reduce Online Copyright Infringement” (27 May 2011). 
19
 “Copyright owners’ expectations for a speedy process, with blocks implemented potentially within 
hours of an application being made, do not appear realistic given the constraints imposed on the Courts 
by the DEA, the need for a process which is fair to the legitimate interests of site operators and end 
users, and the practical challenges arising from the current state of site blocking technologies and 
internet governance” (ibid para. 5.4). However the High Court’s recent decision in Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp. and Ors. v. British Telecom plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) (28 July 2011) has since 
clarified that a species of blocking injunction is already available under s.97A CDPA, albeit of 
narrower scope than the orders envisaged under ss. 17-18 DEA. Further, according to the OFCOM 
report on site-blocking, other strategies for cutting off the supply of unlawful content on the Internet 
remain actively under consideration. It seems likely that these will include government brokering of 
arrangements between industry players whereby online intermediaries ‘voluntarily’ undertake to play a 
more active role in preventing copyright infringement ex ante (see Peter Bradwell, ‘Right-Holders’ 
Proposed Voluntary Website Blocking Scheme’, 22 June 2011, 
www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2011/rights-holders-propose-voluntary-website-blocking-scheme). 
Such a move would be in line with developments elsewhere in recent years: see generally Jeremy de 
Beer and Christopher D. Clemmer, “Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral 
Role for Network Intermediaries?” (2009) 49 Jurimetrics 375, and for a critical assessment of proposed 
US measures (widely referred to as ‘SOPA’ and ‘PIPA’) exemplifying an enforcement policy 
broadly similar to that in ss 17-18 DEA, see Mark A Lemley, David S Levine and David G Post, 'Don't 
Break the Internet' (2011) 64 Stanford Law Review Online, 34-38. 
20
 It was initially envisaged that the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills would be 
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the DEA, but responsibility for the policy area that 
includes the DEA was moved to the DCMS in December 2010. 
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 5 
significantly, IAPs may in the future be required to take ‘technical measures’ (which 
may include capping connection speeds, bandwidth-throttling and disconnection) 
against subscribers who are alleged to be persistent infringers. The Act refers to these 
as the ‘technical obligations’. Together, the initial and technical obligations envisage 
a ‘graduated response’ by IAPs to allegations by right-holders of infringing activity 
by subscribers: an escalating series of warnings and sanctions, possibly culminating in 
disconnection from the Internet. To this extent the DEA mirrors initiatives already 
taken or under consideration in several other countries, and it is clear that UK policy-
makers were influenced to some degree by the French ‘Création et Internet’ 
legislation,
21
  which was first presented to the French Senate in June 2008 and finally 
came into force in 2010 (though only after a challenge to its constitutionality forced a 
re-think).
22
 None of the envisaged obligations depends on IAPs already being liable as 
a matter of private law for the activities of their subscribers, nor does the DEA impose 
such liability. Rather, the obligations in principle affect all IAPs, as defined, simply 
by virtue of being IAPs – although the Act anticipates that secondary legislation will 
limit their application to IAPs with the largest shares of the broadband market. 
Effectively, then, the largest IAPs will be required to assist copyright owners in the 
enforcement of the latter’s private rights against those of their own customers who 
infringe copyright online, even when they are not themselves liable as accessories to 
these customers’ infringements. These IAPs will also have to bear a substantial share 
of the total monetary cost of the new enforcement regimes, although most of that cost 
will be borne by right-holders.  
 
The implementation of the initial obligations regime has, however, been a tortuously 
slow process. The immediate reason for the delay has been a judicial review which 
led to the re-drafting of the two key pieces of secondary legislation required to bring 
the initial obligations into effect. One of these is the order by which OFCOM makes 
the initial obligations Code; the other is the (necessarily prior) order by which the 
Secretary of State specifies how that Code must provide for the apportionment of the 
cost of the initial obligations regime as between copyright owners, IAPs and, in the 
case of subscriber appeals, the subscriber concerned. First drafts of both measures 
were initially published in mid-2010. A second draft of the cost-sharing order was not 
finalised until June 2011, and at the time of writing a second draft of the Initial 
Obligations Code is still awaiting the Secretary of State’s approval. However, because 
                                                 
21
 “Consultation document on legislative options to address illicit P2P file-sharing” (July 2008), Annex 
C. 
22
 See Loi n° 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet 
[Law No. 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 Favouring the Diffusion and Protection of Creation on the 
Internet], amended Sept. 15, 2009, Journal Officiel de la République Française, available at 
http://www.assembleenationale.fr/13/pdf/ta/ta0332.pdf. The legislation originally gave an 
administrative authority power to order IAPs to disconnect subscribers who were suspected of repeat 
infringements for a period of up to one year, and to ‘blacklist’ these subscribers for an equivalent 
period so that no other French IAP could provide an alternative connection. The French Constitutional 
Council took the view that freedom to access the Internet was included in the French Constitution’s 
protection for the freedoms of expression and communication, and condemned the application of the 
sanction of disconnection by an administrative authority as inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence and the right to due process (see decision no. 2009-580DC, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française (June 10, 2009), available at www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision.42666.html). Consequently, the legislation was amended to require a judicial 
hearing before disconnection could occur. 
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 6 
both measures are covered by the Technical Standards Directive (TSD),
23
 both are 
required to be notified to the European Commission under Article 8(1) TSD before 
being laid before Parliament; and Article 9(1) TSD requires that their adoption be 
postponed for three months from notification so that the Commission and other 
Member States may consider whether they create obstacles to the free movement of 
services in the EU. The cost-sharing Order has already been so notified; the Code will 
be notified when approved. Once laid, the negative resolution procedure applies to the 
latter; but the lengthier affirmative resolution procedure applicable to the former 
requires that it meet with the positive approval of each House, rather than no decision 
to annul it, before it can come into effect.  
 
Unquestionably, however, a further reason for the slow pace of the implementation 
process is a growing lack of confidence in the online copyright infringement 
provisions of the DEA – either because of their perceived incompatibility with 
fundamental rights, or because of their likely inefficacy as a tool of economic policy. 
Ever since the Bill was first introduced, these provisions have attracted trenchant 
criticism from civil liberties and consumer rights advocates, and IAPs. All of these 
critics expressed concern about the limited Parliamentary scrutiny received by the Bill 
before it became law, and about the prevalence in sections 3-18 of skeleton powers 
and other provisions delegating legislative power to the Secretary of State or to 
OFCOM. Civil liberties groups have in addition raised concerns about the 
implications for data protection of the proposed process for identifying and retaining 
information about subscribers who have allegedly infringed copyrights, about the 
reliability of the evidence that would trigger action against alleged infringers, about 
the effects on privacy and freedom of expression of disrupting or disconnecting the 
Internet accounts of alleged infringers, about the absence of provision for a court 
hearing before these sanctions would be administered, and about the danger of 
effectively subjecting legitimate content to private forms of censorship. Proponents of 
‘Internet freedom’ have in addition pointed to the risk that the principle of ‘Net 
neutrality’24 will be breached if traffic management tools25 are deployed by IAPs in 
favour of copyright owners. Consumer groups have argued that mass online copyright 
infringement is an inevitable consequence of the cultural industries’ failure to meet 
consumer demand for affordable content in a variety of user-friendly formats. 
                                                 
23
 Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations [1998] OJ L204, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC [1998] OJ L217.  
24
 The principle of ‘Net neutrality’ in its purest form assumes that there should be no discrimination 
between types of data traffic by network operators; and that those delivering content, applications and 
services via the Internet should not be charged by ISPs for the distribution of that content to ISPs’ 
subscribers. The term was coined by Tim Wu: see Tim Wu, “Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination” (2003) 2 Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law 141-79. 
25
 The term ‘traffic management’ refers to a range of techniques that may be used by ISPs to prioritise 
some types of Internet traffic over others, which may be degraded, throttled, or blocked altogether. 
Filtering technologies, for example, “can identify particular types of file (e.g. music files), check 
whether the file is subject to copyright protection and then check whether the person offering the file 
for download has the right to do so. If no such permission is found, the filter can block the download” 
(BERR, “Consultation document on legislative options to address illicit P2P file-sharing” (July 2008), 
para 7.10). Even techniques that aim to filter only unlawful content are regarded by many advocates of 
Net neutrality as immediately suspect as threatening civil liberties (because of the risk that legitimate 
sites and content will be automatically blocked) and at odds with the Internet’s essential nature as “a 
decentralized network, in which no party can unilaterally decide to block the information flowing 
through the communications architecture” (http://www.laquadrature.net/en/Net_Filtering). 
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 7 
Meanwhile, IAPs are divided. Only the seven largest UK IAPs (accounting for around 
90% of the broadband access market) will be caught by the new obligations, and they 
are concerned that many of their subscribers will migrate to smaller IAPs to whom the 
obligations do not apply. Some major IAPs – notably those with substantial content 
interests – have expressed support for the Act.26 However one (TalkTalk), led a 
campaign against the online copyright provisions of the Digital Economy Bill
27
 and, 
along with another major IAP (British Telecom), mounted the legal challenge to 
sections 3-18 of the Act to which brief reference was made above.  
 
These concerns about the online copyright infringement measures might have been 
predicted, but recently criticism has emerged from more surprising quarters. In May 
2011, the U.N. General Assembly published the Report of the Human Rights 
Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression.
28
 The Rapporteur emphasised that international norms 
affecting this right were fully applicable to Internet communications; that facilitating 
access to the Internet and to online content, with as few restrictions as possible, 
should be a priority for all States; and that while States bore the primary duty to 
protect human rights, there was a risk that the Internet’s private sector gatekeepers 
(especially ISPs) might assist, or become complicit with, violation by States of the 
right to freedom of expression online. The measures indicted by the Report as 
threatening the right included disconnection of users for the breach of others’ IPRs – a 
measure which the Rapporteur concluded would necessarily be disproportionate and 
thus a violation of Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
29
 The Rapporteur accordingly expressed ‘alarm’ at “legislation based on the 
concept of ‘graduated response’ … such as the so-called ‘three strikes law’ in France 
and the Digital Economy Act 2010 of the United Kingdom;”30 and he recommended 
that all such legislation be repealed.
31
  
 
While this report found graduated response legislation wanting from a human rights 
perspective, the Hargreaves Report was less than enthusiastic about its economic 
benefits. Though not going so far as to recommend the repeal of the DEA, Hargreaves 
sent a clear message to Government that stringent enforcement measures were 
unlikely on their own to have a significant impact on the incidence of online copyright 
infringement, and could even damage the digital economy if designed or implemented 
in a way that alienated consumers.
32
 In this, Hargreaves echoed the arguments of the 
                                                 
26
 See Emma Barnett, “Digital Economy Act: TalkTalk and BT Mount Legal Challenge” The 
Telegraph, 8 July 2010 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/7878680/Digital-Economy-Act-
TalkTalk-and-BT-mount-legal-challenge.html). 
27
 See http://www.dontdisconnect.us/  
28
 A/HRC/17/27. 
29
 Ibid para. 78. In June 2010, the European Data Protection Supervisor had already expressed the view 
that three strikes disconnection policies involved disproportionate interferences with the right to 
privacy and data protection under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current Negotiations by the European Union of an 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 2010/C 147/01, para. 31). 
30
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression (n28), para. 49. 
31
,Ibid para. 79. 
32
 Hargreaves Report para. 8.45. The Report cautioned that the available statistics on the scale of digital 
piracy and its true impact on growth and incentives in the creative industries were unreliable, and that 
the evidence of the impact of stronger enforcement on levels of online piracy was inconclusive (paras. 
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 8 
many business analysts and copyright industry observers who have warned that the 
industries’ attempts to fight online copyright ‘piracy’ with nothing other than stronger 
enforcement measures are doomed. Rather than persist with futile efforts to control 
the use of digitised content on the Internet, they are increasingly being urged to accept 
that giving content away for free can generate more value than locking it up, and to 
develop mechanisms for monetising this value by means other than metering usage 
and levying copyright royalties.
33
 Sections 3-16 DEA, on the other hand, reflect an 
assumption that mass online copyright infringement poses a major threat to the 
cultural industries, that it can and must be significantly reduced, and that the best way 
to achieve this is by obliging IAPs to police their subscribers’ Internet usage.  
 
This Article undertakes a detailed and comprehensive examination of these provisions 
with a view to illuminating their context and revealing the conflicts they have 
generated – conflicts that continue to yield challenges both to their legality and to 
their legitimacy, and could yet make them a dead letter. Part 2 below identifies the 
regulatory strategy embodied in the provisions, the legal context that frames them, 
and the background to their inclusion in the DEA. Parts 3 and 4 analyse the details of 
the initial and technical obligations regimes (in so far as these are known) 
respectively. Part 5 considers the arrangements for covering the monetary cost of 
implementing these regimes. Part 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 INTERNET ACCESS PROVIDERS, THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES AND 
THE ‘DIGITAL ECONOMY’ 
 
2.1  Copyright Enforcement as Network(ed) Regulation 
 
‘Better’ regulation (as distinct from ‘de-’regulation) has been the stated aim of the UK 
Government’s regulatory activity since the incoming Labour administration’s launch 
of the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) in 1997.
34
 Signalling a departure from 
the avowedly anti-regulatory ideology that had taken root in the 1980s, this approach 
sought a third way between outright hostility to, and unquestioning support for, 
regulatory intervention in economic affairs.
35
 In several influential reports, the BRTF 
repeatedly urged governments to consider a range of regulatory strategies before 
intervening in a given domain of economic activity.
36
 It and its successors have 
                                                                                                                                            
8.9-8.39). The DEA’s enforcement measures, Hargreaves recommended, should be carefully monitored 
so that the approach can be adjusted in the light of new evidence. There is even a suggestion in the 
Report that these measures might be held in reserve for right-holders whose works are held in the 
proposed Digital Copyright Exchange and therefore available for licensing (para 4.34). 
33
 See e.g. Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, 
Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything (2
nd
 ed. (London: Penguin, 2008) p.279. 
34
 The BRTF was replaced by the Better Regulation Commission in 2006, which was in turn replaced 
in 2008. The coalition Government has retained a version of the better regulation agenda: see 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/bre/better-regulation-framework.  
35
 For critical appraisals of the phenomenon, see the essays collected in Stephen Weatherill (ed.) Better 
Regulation (Oxford: Hart 2007). 
36
 See especially Self-Regulation: Interim Report (London: Cabinet Office, 1999), Alternatives to State 
Regulation (London: Cabinet Office, 2000), and Imaginative Thinking for Better Regulation (London: 
Cabinet Office, 2003). 
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 9 
repeatedly emphasised that top-down, heavy-handed, prescriptive regulation can fail 
to achieve its goals, impose costs that outweigh its benefits, and generate unintended 
consequences that exacerbate the problems prompting calls for regulation in the first 
place. Hence they have urged Government to use this ‘classic’ regulatory strategy 
only as a last resort, and then only if it can be shown that the risks of regulatory 
failure had been taken into account and accommodated and that it is likely to be more 
effective than other means such as information and education campaigns (urging 
regulatees to change their behaviour of their own accord), economic incentives (for 
example via taxes that in effect raise the price of undesirable behaviour, but do not 
prohibit it) and self-regulation or co-regulation.  
 
Self-regulation has tended to be understood by UK policy-makers and proponents of 
better regulation as a process whereby ‘industry’ – typically a collective of actors 
involved in a particular industry (e.g. firms, or sectoral representatives) – takes 
initiatives to devise and enforce industry codes of practice, either without government 
involvement, or with only limited involvement by government (for example as a 
facilitator of negotiations). Thus while on this understanding self-regulation is 
consistent with intentional rule-making, these rules are self-formulated, self-enforced 
and hence ‘soft’ (not legally binding). Co-regulation, on the other hand, is self-
regulation backed up in some way by government action. The central case of co-
regulation is rule-making or standard-setting by industry, coupled with some form of 
legislative underpinning for these rules or standards.
37
 Legislation might, for example, 
delegate power to industry to devise and enforce a code of practice regulating action 
in a particular domain (perhaps with the mandatory involvement of other affected 
actors, or ‘stakeholders’, and subject to formal approval by a regulatory agency), and 
equip the relevant Secretary of State with a backstop power to impose one if no code 
is produced voluntarily. OFCOM sees self-regulation and co-regulation as occupying 
points on a spectrum, the latter being an extension of the former and involving “both 
industry and the government (or regulator) administering and enforcing a solution in a 
variety of combinations. Thus the aim is to harness the benefits of self-regulation in 
circumstances where some oversight by OFCOM may still be required.”38 Advantages 
associated with both self- and co-regulation are said to include higher levels of 
commitment to regulatory rules that regulatees perceive as ‘theirs’ and hence 
grounded in reliable information and less intrusive than rules formulated by 
government, lower costs (because industry has a relevant expertise or capacity not 
available to government), and flexibility (because rules can easily be adapted to meet 
changing circumstances).
39
  
 
When illegal file-sharing was first officially identified as a problem requiring a 
regulatory solution, the hope was expressed that IAPs and content providers would 
work together to agree processes and mechanisms for dealing with it, thereby making 
                                                 
37
 “Codes of practice that are negotiated and enforced within the industry are known as self-regulation, 
while those that have a statutory backing or other significant Government involvement are called co-
regulation” (BRTF, Imaginative Thinking for Better Regulation p.41). 
38
 BERR, “Consultation document on legislative options to address illicit P2P file-sharing” (July 2008), 
Annex E, p. 49. 
39
 See e.g. Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2012) Ch. 8; Anthony Ogus, “Rethinking Self-
Regulation” (1995) 15(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97. 
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it unnecessary for government to legislate at all.
40
 As will be shown in Part 2.3 below, 
this hope faded as New Labour’s anti-piracy strategy moved through the various 
iterations generated by successive public consultations, amendments to the Digital 
Economy Bill as it progressed through Parliament, and events subsequent to the Bill’s 
becoming law. With the prospect of industry self-regulation receding, a co-regulatory 
solution was then sought. However when this too failed to materialise, what emerged 
in the Bill – and was subsequently encoded in sections 3-16 DEA – was a strategy of 
‘networked’ regulation41 of online uses of copyright material. As Parts 3 and 4 below 
reveal, the legislation is calculated to mobilise a variety of non-governmental actors – 
right-holders, IAPs, and even subscribers whose broadband accounts might be used to 
infringe without their knowledge – towards monitoring Internet users’ activities and 
identifying and curtailing infringing activity; and in so doing it will trigger the 
deployment of a wide variety of ‘regulatory’ techniques.42 Right-holders will have an 
incentive to refine their technological tools for tracking online activity. The initial 
obligations will require IAPs to use their own information about subscribers’ Internet 
usage to assist copyright owners in singling out individuals deemed particularly 
threatening to right-holder interests for targeted warnings and legal sanctions. The 
technical obligations will, if introduced, require IAPs physically to curb their 
subscribers’ online activities, without the cases against them necessarily being tested 
by a Court or other tribunal. Further, the introduction of these obligations will in turn 
be contingent on right-holders taking other steps to undermine the ‘culture of piracy’ 
on the Web. The copyright industries will have to show that they have made efforts to 
change consumers’ attitudes to copyright law and educate consumers about the 
damage done by infringing activity online. They will also have to show that they have 
made progress towards providing consumers with access to a wider array of 
alternative, lawful, sources of online content. Here lies a clue to what may well be the 
ultimate goal of the DEA’s online copyright infringement provisions. If the copyright 
industries are to be able to point to lawful alternatives to file-sharing, they must 
develop new online distribution channels for their content. Sections 3-16 DEA thus 
seem calculated to nudge the copyright industries and the broadband industry into 
new forms of alliance,
43
 whereby particular IAPs would not only provide Internet 
access but would be paid to deliver particular providers’ content to their own 
subscribers on preferential terms.
44
 The underlying assumption seems to be that a 
restructuring of the online content marketplace along these lines would boost the 
development of the digital economy. 
                                                 
40
 The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property paras 5.92-5.100. 
41
 There are huge literatures on the phenomenon of networked governance, each offering different 
perspectives on how the phenomenon can be understood. For an appropriation of some of these 
perspectives for an account of ‘post-regulatory’ regulation, see Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: 
The Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory World’” (2001) Current Legal 
Problems 103-46. 
42
 Difficulties clearly attend the labelling of non-legal and non-state instruments of behaviour 
management as ‘regulatory’, but not naming them as such risks obscuring the true breadth of the 
strategy under discussion here.  
43
 This intention is vaguely hinted at in various pre-DEA policy documents, e.g. Creative Britain (at 
paras. 5.1-2; and BERR, ‘“Consultation document on legislative options to address illicit P2P file-
sharing” (July 2008) at p.30.  
44
 This of course could in itself have further implications for network neutrality, as IAPs could seek to 
block or degrade even the legitimate content of rival producers. For an analysis of the regulatory issues 
arising in the US context from the interaction of the provision of Internet access and specialised 
services, see James B Speta, “Supervising Managed Services” (2011) 60 Duke Law Jnl. 1715. 
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None of the foregoing is to be taken as suggesting that the DEA regulates a previously 
unregulated zone. The allocation by the State of private rights such as copyrights is 
itself a regulatory strategy oriented towards incentivising behaviour deemed desirable 
and constraining that deemed undesirable, and the bundle of rights comprised in a 
copyright already includes rights – such as the right to control the copying and 
transmission of copyright material – covering those online activities that are currently 
considered to be undermining the cultural industries. However the new provisions 
emerged from a perception that this strategy was simply ineffective to prevent 
unauthorised file-sharing (currently the most significant form of mass online 
infringement), chiefly because the costs associated with invoking private rights 
against this activity are prohibitively high. Copyright owners can locate the Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses of unauthorised uploaders of their copyright works circulating 
in file-sharing networks relatively easily: initiating a download of this material will 
cause the uploader’s IP address to be revealed to the downloader. However, right-
holders cannot unilaterally identify the Internet users to whom those IP addresses 
have been allocated. This information is only held by the user’s ISP, and the ISP 
cannot pass this information on to the copyright owner without a court order: 
specifically, a Norwich Pharmacal order.
45
 Once a court order has been obtained, 
right-holders are in a position to institute proceedings for copyright infringement 
against the named individual, but they have in the past been deterred from incurring 
the costs of legal action because they have lacked a reliable means of distinguishing 
frequent from occasional infringers using IP addresses alone, these generally being 
dynamic – changing each time a subscriber logs on. Since each infringing act of 
‘sharing’ is typically of low value (and right-holders estimate that there are some 6.5 
million people in the UK who are active unlawful file-sharers),
46
 it has not been practical 
or economic for copyright owners to investigate which IP address is associated with 
each and every such act, apply for court orders to identify the perpetrators, and bring 
civil suits against each one. Meanwhile, it is unclear whether copyright liability for 
file-sharing extends beyond the individual uploaders and downloaders who participate 
directly in file-sharing networks, and if so, how far.
47
 The result of these difficulties, 
in the view of the cultural industries and the Government, has been a particular kind 
of market failure. Property rights in the digitised copyright material that circulates 
through file-sharing networks have become virtually unenforceable, with the result 
that ‘free-riding’ on this material – the obtaining of benefits from it by those who 
have not shared in the cost of producing it – has become rife. Unless curtailed, it is 
said, the result of such rampant externalities will be ever-decreasing profits for the 
cultural industries, leading in turn to loss of employment and declining tax revenues.
48
  
                                                 
45
 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133; see now CPR, 
rule 31.18. 
46
 BIS/DCMS, Digital Economy Act: Impact Assessments p.56. 
47
 Haflidi Kristjan Larusson, “Uncertainty in the Scope of Copyright: The Case of Illegal File-Sharing 
in the UK” (2009) EIPR 124. 
48
 BIS/DCMS, Digital Economy Act: Impact Assessments pp. 58-59. This account of the impact of file-
sharing has been contested: see e.g. Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf, “The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis” (2007) 115 J.Pol.Econ. 1;  and Annelies Huygen et 
al., Ups and Downs: Economic and Cultural Effects of File Sharing on Music, Film and Games (TNO, 
2009). So divergent are the statistics that the Hargreaves Review concluded in May 2011 that it is 
“difficult to reach confident conclusions” about the impact of digital copyright piracy (Hargreaves, 
Digital Opportunity p.73). 
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The DEA’s provisions on online copyright infringement reflect a conviction that IAPs 
have capacities and resources that could help to solve this problem, but have failed 
voluntarily to accept responsibility for contributing to a solution and should now be 
compelled to do so.  
 
2.2 The Domestic, EU and International Legal Context 
 
The reasons for IAP inaction are not difficult to fathom. Typically, the contract 
between an ISP and its subscribers prohibits the subscriber from using the service for 
unlawful purposes, but UK IAPs have had few incentives to enforce this contractual 
term against subscribers who infringe copyright. The main reason is that although UK 
copyright law recognises a concept of accessory liability,
49
 EU law (in the shape of 
Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive)
50
 requires that IAPs be given substantial 
immunity from liability for merely supplying the ‘pipes’ through which infringing 
digital content passes.
51
 IAPs have therefore not been inclined to take action against 
subscribers alleged to be using their Internet services unlawfully to download or 
transmit copyright material. A less extensive safe harbour must, under Article 14 of 
the E-Commerce Directive,
52
 be granted to ISPs (such as YouTube) that host or store 
content at the request of subscribers – less extensive because it is conditional on hosts 
taking action once they acquire knowledge that content is being stored unlawfully. 
Still, this has effectively placed the burden on copyright owners to find infringing 
material and inform the ISP of its existence on its network, and even then the 
maximum extent of the ISP’s duty has been to remove, or disable access to, the 
allegedly infringing material. Under Article 15, meanwhile, Member States are 
prohibited from imposing on ISPs a general obligation to monitor the information that 
they transmit or store. Similar immunities have long been available under the laws of 
other jurisdictions.
53
 
 
Since 2008, however, ‘graduated response’ regimes – often called ‘three strikes’ 
regimes
54
 – have mushroomed across the globe, some entirely dependent on private 
                                                 
49
 See e.g. CDPA s.16(2) (defining primary liability for ‘authorising’ any of the acts exclusively 
reserved to the copyright owner), and ss. 22-27 (defining secondary liability for certain acts done in 
relation to acts of primary infringement). 
50
 Directive 2000/31 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market (8 June 2000) [2000] OJ L178. 
51
 Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive defines a ‘safe harbour’ for providers of services that consist 
in the provision of access to a communication network (e.g. via a broadband connection), or the 
automatic transmission of third party content through a network (e.g. by email). Member States are 
obliged to immunise providers from any liability for damages and criminal penalties which would 
otherwise arise from acting as a ‘mere conduit’ for (i.e. merely transmitting) information. The 
conditions attached to this immunity are that the ISP (a) did not initiate the transmission in issue, (b) 
did not single out the recipients of the transmission except by way of an automatic response to the 
request of another person and (c) exercised no editorial function in relation to the information 
transmitted. Regulation 17 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (S.I. 
2002/2013) (hereinafter E-Commerce Regulations) implements Article 12 in the UK.  
52
 This has been transposed into UK law by regulations 19 and 22 of the E-Commerce Regulations. 
53
 See e.g §512 US Copyright Act 1976 (Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 19 October 1976) (17 U.S.C.), 
as inserted by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 28 
October 1998).  
54
 The graduated response strategy is often referred to as a ‘three strikes and you’re out’ approach to 
online copyright infringement, on the basis that disconnection usually occurs after three warning letters 
have been ignored.  
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arrangements between right-holders and ISPs;
55
 others buttressed by legislation or 
judicial decisions.
56
 Meanwhile, negotiations over the terms of a new international 
agreement on the enforcement of IPRs – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) – appeared likely for a time to culminate in a requirement that signatory 
Parties legislate for, or at least encourage the voluntary adoption of, both graduated 
response schemes and proactive copyright enforcement by IAPs. A draft ‘internet 
enforcement chapter’ (dated 30 September 2009) mooted rules requiring ACTA 
signatories to replicate U.S. law by making ISP safe harbours conditional on their 
“put[ting] in place policies to deter unauthorised storage and transmission of … 
infringing content [for example] clauses in customers’ contracts allowing, inter alia, a 
graduated response.”57 This in turn prompted a worldwide coalition of consumer 
groups, civil liberties NGOs, ISP industry associations and Web 2.0 firms to produce 
an open letter
58
 expressing concern about both the process and substance of the 
negotiations.
59
 As to substance, the letter charged that the proposed Internet 
enforcement chapter could hinder innovation while undermining fundamental rights, 
especially freedom of expression and communication privacy. In a resolution passed 
in March 2010, the European Parliament also expressed its concern over the lack of 
transparency in the ACTA negotiations to that point, and called for an assessment of 
ACTA’s projected impact on fundamental rights. In particular, the resolution 
articulated the Parliament’s view that “in order to respect fundamental rights, such as 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy … the proposed agreement 
should not make it possible for any so-called ‘three-strikes’ procedures to be 
imposed” and that “any agreement must include the stipulation that the closing-off of 
an individual’s Internet access shall be subject to prior examination by a court.” 60  
 
                                                 
55
 The efforts of the Record Industry Association of America (RIAA) in this regard have been 
particularly well publicised:  (see e.g “RIAA CEO Encourages ISPs to Work with Music Industry to 
Address Digital Theft” (RIAA press release, 6 May 2008, and Greg Sandoval, “Top ISPs Poised to 
Adopt Graduated Response to Piracy”, June 22 2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20073522-
261/exclusive-top-isps-poised-to-adopt-graduated-response-to-piracy/.  It is certainly within the power 
of US ISPs to design their terms of use to enable them to suspend access to their services in cases of 
suspected repeat infringement, and some have: see Annemarie Bridy, “Graduated Response and the 
Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement” (2010) 89 Oregon Law Review 81. 
56
 At the time of writing, such legislation has been enacted in France, New Zealand, South Korea and 
Taiwan, as well as the UK. For an analysis of relevant Australian case law, see Robert Burrell  and 
Kimberlee Weatherall, “Providing Services to Copyright Infringers: Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet 
Ltd” (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 723. 
57
 European Commission “ACTA Negotiations – Internet Chapter” (Ref. 588/09) (available at:  
http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/ACTA_Draft_Internet_Chapter). (§ 512(i)(1)(A) of the US Copyright 
Act conditions its safe harbours on the ISP having “a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers … who are repeat infringers.”) 
58
 http://freeknowledge.eu/acta-a-global-threat-to-freedoms-open-letter  
59
 ACTA negotiations occurred outside the framework of existing institutions such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation and the WTO, and largely in secret, prompting concerns about the 
transparency of the process. 
60
 European Parliament Resolution on the transparency and state of play of the ACTA negotiations, 10 
March 2010 (P7_TA(2010)0058). See also the Parliament’s Resolution on Cultural Industries in 
Europe, 10 April 2008 (P6_TA(2008)0123), urging EU Member States “to avoid adopting measures 
conflicting with civil liberties and human rights and with the principles of proportionality, effectiveness 
and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of Internet access.” 
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A consolidated draft text of ACTA – released for public discussion in April 201061 – 
contained no provisions requiring signatories to direct ISPs to introduce either 
graduated response or filtering/blocking regimes. Instead the text identified ‘options’ 
for consideration by the negotiators that would have allowed Parties to legislate for 
such regimes, and would have required signatories eschewing compulsion to promote 
their voluntary development instead.
62
 The finalised text published on 3 December 
2010
63
 was further diluted. It commits each Party to ensuring that enforcement 
procedures are available against infringements of IPRs taking place online, but also to 
ensuring that these are implemented “in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers 
to legitimate activity, including electronic commerce, and … preserves fundamental 
principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy.”64 Further, it 
contains no commitment to promote graduated response regimes as such, only an 
undertaking to “endeavour to promote cooperative efforts within the business 
community to effectively address … copyright or related rights infringement while 
preserving legitimate competition and consistent with each Party’s law, preserving 
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy.”65 
 
Of course nothing in ACTA prevents signatory Parties from electing, as the UK has, 
to enact legislation imposing graduated response regimes, although EU Member 
States taking this route must comply with applicable EU law. Nothing in the Directive 
on the Enforcement of IPRs
66
 specifically prevents or authorises the measures set out 
in the DEA,
67
 although the European Commission has in the last three years been 
responding to the concerns of national authorities and ‘stakeholders’ about the 
increasing incidence of IPR infringement, including online copyright infringement. 
One of its initiatives has been to encourage talks between those affected by unlawful 
file-sharing with a view to securing voluntary cooperation within the existing legal 
framework.
68
 In December 2010 the Commission reported that the Enforcement 
Directive “was not designed with the challenge posed by the Internet … in mind”69 
and suggested that “[g]iven intermediaries’ favourable position to contribute to the 
prevention and termination of online infringements, the Commission could explore 
how to involve them more closely.”70 A review of the Enforcement Directive is 
expected in early 2012.  
                                                 
61
 ACTA “Consolidated Text Prepared for Public Release”, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.  
62
 Ibid, Article 2.18 para. 3quater: “Each Party shall promote the development of mutually supportive 
relationships between online service providers and right holders to deal effectively with … copyright or 
related rights infringement which takes place by means of the Internet, including the encouragement of 
establishing guidelines for the actions which should be taken” (emphasis added). See also Annemarie 
Bridy, “ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response” (2011) 26(3) Am. Law Rev. 558-77. 
63
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf. 
64
 ACTA Article 27 paras. 1 and 2. 
65
 Ibid. para. 3 
66
 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157. 
67
 Consequently, legal arrangements for dealing with online copyright infringement vary considerably 
among the Member States: for an overview, see Commission Staff Working Document, “Analysis of 
the Application of Directive 2004/48/EC in the Member States” SEC (2010) 1589 final (22 December 
2010). 
68
 See European Commission, “Synthesis Report on the Stakeholders' Dialogue on Illegal Up- and 
Downloading 2009–2010” (March 2011). 
69
 European Commission, “Report on the Application of Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights” COM(2010) 779 final (22 December 2010), p.9. 
70
 Ibid. p.7.  
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At present, however, the relevant EU law comprises the E-Commerce Directive 
referred to above, together with the so-called ‘Telecoms Package’ – the EU’s 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services. 
Implemented in 2003 with the aim of making the electronic communications sector in 
the EU more competitive, the package comprises a general ‘Framework’ Directive71 
and four specific Directives. The ‘Authorisation’ Directive72 harmonises and 
simplifies the process by which national regulatory authorities confer entitlements to 
provide electronic communications networks and services. Its main innovation was to 
require Member States to replace individualised licensing arrangements with ‘general 
authorisation schemes’: general conditions of entitlement to provide networks and 
services. The ‘Access’ Directive73 harmonises how Member States regulate the terms 
on which providers may access, and/or interconnect with, each other’s networks and 
services. The ‘Universal Service’ Directive74 requires Member States to ensure that a 
minimum set of electronic communications services of a certain quality (including 
e.g. a connection to a public telephone network that allows functional Internet access) 
is made available at an affordable price to all end-users. Finally, the ‘Privacy and 
Electronic Communications’ Directive75 translates the principles of the Data 
Protection Directive
76
 into specific rules for the electronic communications sector. 
Given their particular importance in regulating the operation of graduated response 
regimes, the provisions of these two Directives will be briefly elaborated here.  
 
The Data Protection Directive (DPD) regulates the processing of individuals’ personal 
data. “Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.”77 Thus data are ‘personal’ when it is reasonably possible 
to link the information to a person (the ‘data subject’), even (arguably) if the holder of 
the data cannot make this link.
78
 ‘Processing’ in the context of the DPD means ‘any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not 
by automatic means’ and includes collection, storage, dissemination and blocking.79 
The DPD provides that Member States’ implementing legislation must apply the 
Directive’s requirements to the ‘controller’ of this processing, defined as ‘the natural 
or artificial person … which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and 
means of’ the processing.80 Article 6 requires Member States to provide that personal 
data may only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and not 
                                                 
71
 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services [2002] OJ L108. 
72
 Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services 
[2002] OJ L108.  
73
 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities [2002] OJ L108. 
74
 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services [2002] OJ L108. 
75
 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L201. 
76
 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281. 
77
 DPD, Article 2(a) 
78
 See e.g Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 
(WP136), 20 June 2007 (adopting a broad interpretation of ‘personal data’). 
79
 DPD, Article 2(b). 
80
 Ibid Article 2(d). 
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further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes; and that any processing 
be relevant and proportionate to the purpose pursued. Article 7 lists among the 
purposes that qualify as legitimate those of: ensuring the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party; ensuring compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the controller is subject; ensuring performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third 
party to whom the data are disclosed; and protecting the legitimate interests of the 
controller or a third party to whom the data are disclosed (except where such interests 
are overridden by the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject, and in 
particular the right to privacy). Under Article 8, extra restrictions apply to the 
processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and details of the subject’s 
health or sex life. The provisions of the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Directive (PECD) ‘particularise and complement’81 the DPD for the purpose (inter 
alia) of protecting the confidentiality of users’ communications through publicly 
available networks and services. Among the matters regulated by the PECD are the 
surveillance, interception, storage and retention of users’ communications and any 
related traffic and location data.
82
 
 
The Telecoms package was amended in December 2009,
83
 after extensive 
negotiations that one commentator has claimed were ‘hi-jacked’ by opponents of the 
further spread of graduated response regimes across the EU’s Member States.84 The 
amendments included changes to Article 1(3) of the Universal Service Directive, 
which now provides that measures taken by Member States regarding end-users’ 
access to, or use of, the Internet “shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, including in relation to privacy and due process.”85 A new paragraph 
added to Article 1 of the Framework Directive echoes this, but further stipulates that 
where fundamental rights are engaged by such measures, the latter can only be 
imposed if appropriate, proportionate, necessary within a democratic society, and 
subject to adequate procedural safeguards including effective judicial protection and 
due process. Accordingly, such measures may only be taken with due respect for the 
principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. A prior, fair and 
impartial procedure must be guaranteed, including the right of the person concerned 
to be heard; and the right to effective and timely judicial review shall also be 
guaranteed.
86
 These amendments represent a dilution of two earlier proposals – 
referred to throughout the blogosphere as ‘Amendment 166/Article 32(a)’ to the 
Universal Service Directive and ‘Amendment 138/Article 8.4(g)’ to the Framework 
Directive – that were originally promoted by large majorities in the European 
                                                 
81
 Article 1(2) PECD. 
82
Traffic data relate to e.g. the routing, duration, time, format and volume of electronic 
communications. Location data give the geographic position of a user’s terminal equipment. 
83
 See Directive 2009/140/EC (amending the Framework, Access and Authorisation Directives) [2009] 
OJ L337 and Directive 2009/136/EC (amending the Universal Service and E-Privacy Directives) 
[2009] OJ L337. 
84
 Francesco Rizzuto, “European Union Telecommunications Law Reform and Combating Online Non-
Commercial Infringements of Copyright” (2011) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 75. 
85
 Article 1(1) Directive 2009/136/EC 
86
 Article 1.1(b), Directive 2009/140/EC (inserting a new Article 1.3(a) into the Framework Directive). 
See also Recital 4 (recognising that the Internet is essential for education and for the practical exercise 
of freedom of expression and access to information). 
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Parliament. Amendment 138 in particular would have required disconnection from the 
Internet to be authorised by a court except where public security was threatened:
87
 its 
objective was to ensure that Member States would be prohibited from introducing 
‘three strikes’ regimes without judicial oversight. By contrast, the prior ‘fair and 
impartial procedure’ and ‘judicial review’ now referred to in Article 1.3(a) of the 
Framework Directive seem only to guarantee a court hearing on appeal from an initial 
ruling (which must be ‘fair and impartial’ but could be non-judicial) to disconnect.88   
 
At the international and regional levels, then, efforts had been under way since 2008 
to advance policies that – formally or informally – would have put IAPs’ 
informational and technical resources at the service of copyright owners so that 
Internet users’ activities could be more effectively monitored and infringing activities 
more effectively curtailed. These efforts had been contested by broad coalitions of 
Internet businesses and civil society groups on the ground that they would harm, 
rather than help, the digital economy while at the same time threatening the rights and 
freedoms of Internet users. It was against this backdrop that the UK Government’s 
own policy to combat online copyright infringement, now expressed in the DEA, first 
took shape. 
 
2.3 Background to sections 3-16 DEA  
 
The first explicit commitment by the UK Government to enact legislation compelling 
IAPs to crack down on illegal file-sharing – apparently in response to energetic 
lobbying by the music industry
89
 – was made with the publication in February 2008 of 
the Creative Britain report, setting out the New Labour Government’s policy on the 
creative industries. However, what the Government actually announced here was a 
strategy of encouraging right-holders and IAPs to work together to agree an approach 
to curbing illegal file-sharing, while insisting that it would not hesitate to legislate in 
this area if no common approach could be agreed. While maintaining a robust system 
of copyright protection, it would also encourage content providers and network 
operators to work together to develop “new business models which recognise changes 
in technology – and their democratisation of content – yet capture the value provided 
by content producers and distributors.”90 The Government’s view seemed to be that 
illegal file-sharing was a symptom, not simply of a widespread lack of respect for 
IPRs and IAPs’ blinkered concern with growing their share of the broadband market, 
but also of content providers’ failure to respond to consumer perceptions that content 
should (and could) be made available online in more appropriately priced and 
convenient formats than those currently available. It made business sense, the 
Government hinted, for content providers to develop new products and services to 
offset the decline in their traditional revenues, and equally for network operators to 
diversify beyond the provision of access and pipes into the distribution of legitimate 
content under licence from right-holders. Hence “the integration of anti-piracy 
                                                 
87
See 
http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_138_.2B.2B
.2B. 
88
 For critical commentary, see Monica Horten, “Telecoms Package: The Verdict” 
(http://www.iptegrity.com 13 November 2009)  
89
 John Naughton, “A clampdown is music to the record industry's ears” The Observer, 17 February 
2008 (available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/feb/17/3/print). 
90
 Creative Britain p.50 
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measures into a wider collaboration between content and network providers could 
create a healthier digital environment which would benefit consumers and creators.”91  
 
In July 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding on an Approach to Reduce Unlawful 
File-sharing (MoU) was agreed between key ‘stakeholders’ from the ISP industry, the 
content industries, OFCOM and the Government. In an obvious attempt to take 
forward the ‘wider collaboration’ sought by the Government, the MoU committed 
signatories to cooperate, not only in devising and operationalising a process for 
curbing mass file-sharing and joining a group convened by OFCOM “to explore 
effective mechanisms to deal with repeat infringers,”92 but also in educating 
consumers about the damage done to the creative industries by infringing activity 
(thereby changing public attitudes to copyright) and organising legal access to content 
in a variety of new formats (thereby routing consumer demand for unlawful file-
sharing services towards attractive lawful alternatives). Mechanisms to be considered 
by the group would include “technical measures such as traffic management or 
filtering and marking of content”93 that would require intervention by ISPs, as well as 
actions right-holders might take against serious infringers. The group would 
ultimately produce codes of practice governing the deployment of these mechanisms. 
All codes would require the approval of OFCOM: this was designed to ensure that 
they accorded with the principles governing all of OFCOM’s regulatory activities, and 
hence that the actions required by the codes would be non-discriminatory, objectively 
justifiable, proportionate, transparent, strike an appropriate balance between the 
interests of right-holders and IAPs and comply with relevant provisions of EU and 
domestic law. 
 
However, many smaller IAPs were not party to the MoU, generating concerns that 
non-cooperative IAPs would attract subscribers away from signatories and thereby 
precipitate the collapse of the agreement.
94
 The Government’s next step (in July 2008) 
was to propose a different kind of co-regulatory regime than that initially envisaged, 
for dealing with the specific issue of unlawful P2P file-sharing.
95
 It proposed that 
IAPs and right-holders would – with the Government’s encouragement – cooperate 
along the lines set out in the MoU, in particular by producing codes of practice setting 
out the kinds of actions that IAPs would be expected to take against alleged online 
infringers. However these codes would be accompanied by a duty on all IAPs, 
enshrined in legislation, to have an effective policy in place for dealing with cases of 
alleged unlawful file-sharing, and to act to implement that policy where it could be 
demonstrated that an individual subscriber was infringing copyright.
96
 That duty – 
which “would be designed to apply only to unlawful file-sharing over P2P 
networks”97 – could be discharged by demonstrating compliance with the codes, but 
IAPs not party to the self-regulatory arrangement would remain bound by the 
underlying requirement.
98
  
                                                 
91
 Ibid.  
92
 BERR, “Consultation Document on Legislative Options to Address Illicit Peer-to-Peer (P2P) File-
Sharing” (July 2008), (Annex D) p.47. 
93
 Ibid. p.48 
94
 Ibid, paras. 6.2, 8.6. 
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 Ibid paras. 8.1-8.12. 
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 Ibid. 
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By January 2009 it was apparent to the Government that this approach would not 
work as initially conceived either: the proposed IAP obligation was considered too 
vague, and the overall approach not guaranteed fairly to represent the interests of all 
stakeholders, including the smaller IAPs and consumers.
99
  What then emerged was 
yet another version of the co-regulatory approach, under which the regime governing 
online copyright infringement would comprise a combination of legislative provisions 
clearly defining the kinds of actions IAPs would be obliged to take against alleged 
infringers, and industry codes dealing with the implementation of these obligations. 
IAPs would be legally required to take two kinds of action when specific instances of 
infringing activity by their subscribers (identified at this point only via their IP 
addresses) were reported to them by right-holders.
100
 The first obligation would be to 
notify the alleged infringer of the reported infringement. The second would be to keep 
records of the number of notifications linked to each subscriber, compile lists of 
subscribers with multiple notifications (anonymised to ensure compliance with data 
protection legislation), and make these lists available to the relevant right-holders on 
request. Right-holders could use the lists to single out subscribers who appeared to be 
repeat infringers and apply for a court order to obtain the names and addresses of 
those on the lists. This in turn would pave the way for right-holders to “take targeted 
legal action against those who appear to be responsible for the most damage to the 
[creative industries].”101  
 
The Government insisted that what it called the ‘practical details’ of the two proposed 
obligations – such as what standard of evidence should be required to support a 
notification of infringement, how many notifications would justify inclusion in a list 
of repeat infringers, and what kind of appeal mechanism should be available to 
subscribers who believed they were wrongly accused of infringement – should not be 
set out in legislation but rather in an industry code of practice.
102
 It clearly retained the 
hope that an ‘industry body’ (not a new government regulator) bringing together 
content providers and IAPs would emerge to draft a code of practice for OFCOM to 
approve,
103
  failing which OFCOM would have a backstop power to create its own 
code. Hence during the first half of 2009, the Government sought views on the 
potential for the creation of such a ‘Digital Rights Agency’, and – as it had when the 
MoU was concluded – it still envisaged this as having a number of possible roles in 
relation to the online use of copyright material, not limited to that of devising a 
process to deal with file-sharing.
104
 By November 2009 no such agency had 
materialised, and legislation had been drafted to prepare the ground for the two 
obligations outlined above (as well as other related obligations to be discussed 
                                                 
99
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100
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below). Having been introduced in November 2009, the Digital Economy Bill had 
passed the Lords by mid-March 2010; by 8 April it had received Royal Assent after 
being rushed through the Commons by means of the ‘wash-up’ procedure – normally 
only used to ensure that uncontroversial legislation can be passed quickly before a 
Parliament is dissolved – ahead of the April 12 dissolution of Parliament in advance 
of the 6 May General Election. Shortly thereafter, OFCOM issued its own draft Initial 
Obligations Code for consultation. 
 
Almost immediately, BT and TalkTalk sought judicial review of the DEA’s online 
copyright infringement provisions, and of the draft Statutory Instrument setting out 
how the costs associated with the initial obligations were to be apportioned. The main 
ground of challenge was that sections 3-18 DEA should themselves have been 
notified in draft to the EU Commission as a regime of technical regulations/rules on 
information society services within the meaning of the Technical Standards Directive, 
and that since they were not so notified the provisions were unenforceable. The 
claimants also argued that the contested provisions were incompatible with the E-
Commerce Directive, the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive, and the 
Authorisation Directive; and that they were disproportionate in their impact on IAPs, 
on consumers, and on subscribers (such as public libraries) who also provide Internet 
access to end-users. In April 2011 the High Court ruled against the claimants on all 
grounds except one (the compatibility of the cost-sharing Order with the 
Authorisation Directive).
105
 The Court of Appeal is due to hear an appeal against this 
ruling early in 2012. 
 
 
3 THE “INITIAL OBLIGATIONS”  
 
3.1 The Legislation 
 
Sections 3-16 amend the Communications Act 2003 (c.21) (hereinafter CA) by the 
insertion into that Act of new sections 124A-N. Sections 124A-B CA outline two 
“initial” obligations that may be imposed on any ISP whose service consists “entirely 
or mainly of the provision of access to the internet” and includes the allocation of IP 
addresses to subscribers (i.e., any IAP).
106
 The first is to send notifications to 
subscribers following receipt of reports – “copyright infringement reports” (CIRs) – 
from copyright owners that these subscribers have been engaging in copyright-
infringing activity.
107
 The second is to maintain anonymised “copyright infringement 
lists” (CILs) of subscribers who appear to be persistent infringers and make these 
available to copyright owners on request.
108
 “Subscriber” is defined as a person who 
receives an internet access service under an agreement with the service provider, but 
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106
 Section 124N CA.  
107
 Section 124A CA. 
108
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not as a communications provider.
109
 Under new section 124A(1) CA, a right-holder 
may issue a CIR if it appears to them that a subscriber has (a) infringed their 
copyright by means of an internet access service or (b) has allowed another person to 
use the service, and that other person has infringed the right-holder’s copyright. The 
question here, then, is not whether the subscriber has actually given permission to 
another person to use his/her service, much less that s/he has actually given 
permission to another to use it for infringing purposes: the issue is simply whether it 
appears to the right-holder that the subscriber has allowed another person to use their 
service, and that person has infringed the right-holder’s copyright.  
 
Here the de-centred (or ‘networked’) regulatory strategy characteristic of the DEA – 
and the rich mix of regulatory agents and instruments already noted in Part 2.1 above 
– is very clearly in evidence. As section 124A(1) shows, subscribers are to be the 
focus of the IAP’s notifying activities, regardless of whether they themselves have 
infringed or knew of others’ infringing activities. This in turn seems calculated to 
mobilise householders in particular to police all Internet use occurring within their 
homes. The same would seem to apply to employers in relation to their staff, but also 
to libraries, educational institutions and other providers of open access wi-fi facilities 
in relation to all the many (and mostly anonymous) users who make use of these 
facilities. The DEA will incentivise these private parties to, for example, encrypt their 
services so that only particular individuals will be able to use them (something at odds 
with very concept of open access and indeed the spirit of the Digital Britain report);
110
 
and/or to block or filter content themselves.
111
 The notification process envisaged by 
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the Act will also be a vehicle for educating subscribers about the importance of 
respecting copyright, and prompting them to seek out lawful sources of copyright 
content online.
112
  
 
New sections 124C-D CA (inserted by sections 5-6 DEA) oblige OFCOM to approve 
or make an “initial obligations code,” which once in force would bring the two initial 
IAP obligations into effect, define them in detail and institute mechanisms for their 
implementation. New sections 124C-E together set out procedural and substantive 
criteria governing the making or approval of this code. Section124E (inserted by 
section 7 DEA) sets out what the code must contain, including inter alia details of the 
procedures that right-holders and IAPs must follow in relation to the two initial 
obligations – in particular concerning the standard that evidence must meet if it is to 
justify a CIR, the format and content of the notification letters sent by IAPs, and the 
means of determining the subscribers (‘relevant subscribers’) eligible for inclusion in 
the CILs that ISPs are obliged under section 124B to maintain.
113
 Section 124E also 
stipulates that the code must provide that OFCOM administer and enforce it,
114
 and 
that it meet the requirements of new section 124K CA (inserted by section 13 DEA) 
concerning subscriber appeals. Under section 124K the code must confer on 
subscribers the right to appeal to a person who is independent of IAPs, right-holders 
and OFCOM;
115
 there is no requirement that the code provide for a judicial hearing. 
As far as the initial obligations are concerned a subscriber appeal is an appeal by a 
subscriber, on grounds specified in the code, in relation to the making of a CIR about 
a subscriber, its notification to the subscriber, the inclusion of a subscriber in a CIL, 
or “any other act or omission in relation to an initial obligation or an initial 
obligations code.”116 The code must include as possible grounds for appeal that a CIR 
is flawed in that it does not relate to an act which amounts to a copyright 
infringement, and/or that an apparently infringing act was incorrectly attributed to the 
subscriber’s account (the burden of showing that a CIR is irreproachable in both 
respects rests on the respondent
117
); and that the right-holder or IAP has contravened 
the code or an obligation regulated by the code. The code must also provide that a 
subscriber appeal must succeed in respect of a CIR where the subscriber shows that 
the act described in the CIR was not carried out by the subscriber and that the 
subscriber took reasonable steps to prevent other persons using their account to 
infringe copyright.
118
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 See section 124A(6) CA (setting out what a notification to a subscriber must include). 
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3.2 The Initial Obligations Code  
 
As noted already, the Labour Government’s hope throughout the process of devising 
its programme of action on online copyright infringement had been that ‘industry’ 
would be able to devise a code for OFCOM to approve. This hope was reiterated in 
January 2010, when the Government acknowledged that it would be the code, not the 
primary legislation, that would effectively define the two initial obligations, the 
rationale being that “[t]his is a fast changing area of technology and consumer 
behaviour and the processes behind the obligations need to be flexible and adaptable 
if the obligations are to remain proportionate and effective.”119 In the end, OFCOM 
itself drafted an Initial Obligations Code,
120
 and it bore out the Government’s 
prediction, adding much detail to the vague picture yielded by the legislation of how 
the notification/listing system would operate in practice. Progress on finalising this 
Code was then delayed by a number of unforeseen developments – notably the High 
Court’s ruling on British Telecom’s legal challenge to sections 3-18 DEA (hereinafter 
British Telecom), which necessitated some changes to the May 2010 draft, in 
particular as regards cost-sharing. At the time of writing, the DCMS is reconsidering 
OFCOM’s finalised text in the light of comments from the Regulatory Policy 
Committee.  
 
The most noteworthy sections of the 2010 draft specify the following:  
 
 The IAPs that will be subject to the two initial obligations. Only those IAPs 
providing a fixed Internet access service to more than 400,000 subscribers 
(currently seven UK IAPs) will qualify in the first instance. However OFCOM 
proposes to keep the qualification criteria under review, and if the number of 
potential CIRs made by right-holders in relation to non-qualifying IAPs rises 
significantly, to assume that this reflects migration by infringers to these other 
providers and alter the criteria to include them. 
 The right-holders that will be able to take advantage of the two initial 
obligations. Only those that have sent estimates in advance to qualifying IAPs 
of the number of CIRs they intend to issue in a given period (so that IAPs can 
plan ahead and budget for the extra burden that processing these will impose 
on them), and have met their share of the costs of the notification/listing 
regime (specified in an order made by the Secretary of State under section 
124M, considered below), will qualify.  
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 The information that will have to be contained in CIRs. This includes the 
filenames of allegedly infringing files; relevant IP addresses, port numbers, 
website addresses and protocols; and details of the exact date and time of the 
alleged infringement.  
 The notification process. The Code provides for this to involve a series of 
three notifications to apparently infringing subscribers, depending on their 
behaviour over time. The first will be sent after receipt by the IAP of the first 
CIR relating to that subscriber. The second will be sent after the first CIR 
relating to the same subscriber (though not necessarily from the same right-
holder) to be received between one and six months from the date of the first 
notification. The third will be sent after the first CIR relating to the same 
subscriber to be received one month or later from the date of the second 
notification – unless this CIR is received more than 12 months after the first 
CIR. The Code’s provisions regarding the content of these notifications 
largely reflect the requirements of new section 124A(6) and (7) CA. 
 The process of compiling copyright infringement lists. Qualifying IAPs will 
be required to keep a database of all subscribers receiving a third notification 
within the previous 12 months. The criteria for determining the ‘relevant 
subscribers’ who may be included in a CIL provided by an IAP provides to a 
copyright owner are (a) whether the subscriber has been included in the 
database, and (b) whether that owner has sent at least one CIR relating to that 
subscriber within the previous 12 months. Each list will only contain 
information relating to CIRs sent by the requesting right-holder.  
 Provision for subscriber appeals. The DEA requires OFCOM to establish an 
independent appeals body to determine subscriber appeals. The draft Code sets 
out this body’s principal functions and the framework of rules within which it 
will be required to operate. Most of these rules mirror new section 124K CA, 
although the Code requires in addition, inter alia, that the appeals body protect 
the anonymity of subscribers in the appeals process. Once established, that 
body will institute detailed procedures for the determination of subscriber 
appeals in accordance with the Code. The Code envisages that only in 
exceptional circumstances, where the appeals body considers it appropriate, 
will oral submissions be accepted or oral hearings held in determining a 
subscriber appeal.  
 
At this point it is worth emphasising once again that although the initial obligations 
regime will mobilise IAPs to engage in a ‘graduated response’ to allegations by right-
holders of infringements by subscribers, at no point will the response involve their 
administering sanctions: to this extent, the initial obligations regime is not analogous 
to the more draconian French regime – which is a true ‘three strikes’ regime.121 
Unless and until the DEA’s technical obligations are brought into effect, a graduated 
response à l’Anglaise can lead only to the sending of anonymised lists of apparently 
serial infringers to right-holders, who must then seek court orders to obtain the 
personal details of these individuals if they wish to take the further step of issuing 
infringement proceedings against them. Parker J. pointed out in British Telecom that 
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this system is “more efficient, focussed and fair”122 than the pre-DEA arrangements, 
which have effectively incentivised right-holders to use the blunt (and intimidating) 
instrument of legal action indiscriminately against everyone suspected of any 
infringement whatsoever.
123
 Nonetheless, the picture of the reporting, notification and 
listing processes that emerges from the draft Code will not entirely reassure those who 
are concerned about the DEA’s implications for civil liberties, and Internet freedom in 
particular. On the one hand, OFCOM is clearly concerned to ensure that these 
processes produce accurate CIRs, notifications and CILs, so that “where allegations 
are made against subscribers they are based upon credible evidence, gathered in a 
robust manner.”124 The Code will require right-holders to provide annual quality 
assurance reports to OFCOM on their processes for linking IP addresses with 
infringing activity, so that the regulator can be sure that these are robust and yield 
accurate results. It will also require IAPs to have in place effective technical systems 
to link IP addresses with particular subscribers, so that the regulator can be sure that 
these reliably identify the subscribers that ought to receive notifications. Yet the more 
accurate these processes and systems, the more potent the capacity of right-holders 
and IAPs to track individuals’ Internet usage: paradoxically, systems designed to 
eliminate one source of grievance for individuals (false accusations of copyright 
infringement) necessarily give rise to another (that every move they make online will 
be subject to surveillance and traceable back to them). This in turn raises issues about 
the compatibility of the initial obligations regime with the freedom and confidentiality 
of Internet users’ communications, matters heavily regulated by EU law.  
 
3.3  The Initial Obligations Regime and EU Law 
 
Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) – preventing Member States from 
imposing general obligations on ISPs to monitor the content they transmit or store, or 
actively to look for evidence of unlawful usage of their facilities – is arguably 
justified in part by the concern that these private actors should have no incentive to 
censor their users’ communications. In British Telecom, Parker J. was disinclined to 
hold that the legislative design of the initial obligations regime contradicted Article 
15. Requiring IAPs to notify, and maintain lists of, allegedly infringing subscribers 
would not, in Parker J.’s view, amount to obligations on them to monitor the 
information they transmitted, or to examine all their subscribers’ usage with a view to 
finding infringing communications, but only to identify particular alleged wrongdoers 
in response to reports from right-holders who had taken it upon themselves to monitor 
the activities of Internet users in general. However this analytical separation of 
monitoring from identification seems artificial in relation to the regulatory strategy 
underlying the DEA. As noted in Part 2 above, that strategy consists precisely in 
breaking down a regulatory function – that of curtailing online copyright infringement 
– into a number of constituent elements, and distributing these amongst a variety of 
actors perceived as having the capacity to contribute to the function’s discharge. In 
effect, the DEA’s initial obligations regime makes the IAP an agent of those right-
holders who are de facto engaged in general monitoring of the information they 
(IAPs) transmit, and actively seeking circumstances indicating illegal activity.  
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Even if this monitoring involves no formal conflict with Article 15 ECD, a further 
question arises concerning its compatibility with the protection for Internet users’ 
privacy that EU law requires. The production of CIRs by copyright owners, first of 
all, will involve finding and recording dynamic IP addresses – activities which will 
arguably render them ‘controllers’ of the ‘processing’ of ‘personal data’ within the 
terms of EU data protection law.
125
 Moreover the material identified as linked with 
these addresses could fall into one or more of the special categories of personal data 
(concerning e.g. the political opinions of the user) listed in Article 8 of the Data 
Protection Directive (DPD). However in British Telecom, Parker J. stressed that the 
DPD did not prevent Member States from allowing the processing of personal data – 
whether it falls within or outside the sensitive categories – where “necessary for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”;126 and that it was precisely the 
purpose of the contested provisions to facilitate copyright owners in establishing and 
exercising their legal claims against infringers. Further, Parker J. accepted that IAP 
activities of notifying subscribers and compiling CILs, though clearly also involving 
the processing of personal data within the meaning of the DPD, were authorised as 
“necessary for compliance with … legal obligation[s]” to which IAPs will be subject 
once the Code is in force.
127
  
 
The processing of personal data “in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services in public communications networks in 
the Community” is however subject to additional regulation under the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Directive (PECD).
128
 The data processed by both 
copyright owners and IAPs under the initial obligations regime will include 
subscribers’ ‘traffic data’, and the DEA’s endorsement of the tracking of user 
communications by these actors prima facie contravenes the obligation on Member 
States under Article 5 PECD to “ensure the confidentiality of [Internet users’] 
communications and the related traffic data.” Moreover, the Act’s imposition of 
obligations on IAPs to make CILs ostensibly contravenes the requirement imposed on 
ISPs under Article 6 PECD that traffic data be “erased or made anonymous when it is 
no longer needed for the purpose of the transmission of a communication.”129 
However, both of these Articles are without prejudice to Article 15(1) PECD, which 
allows Member States to adopt legislative measures restricting the obligation to 
respect the confidentiality of users’ communications and related traffic data. The 
compatibility of the reporting and listing activities envisaged by the DEA with the 
PECD therefore depends on whether these activities come within the scope of a 
derogation that in turn is covered by Article 15(1). 
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Prior to the enactment of the DEA, the ECJ had already ruled in Promusicae v 
Telefónica that Article 15(1) allowed PECD obligations to be restricted not only in the 
circumstances specifically mentioned there (i.e. to safeguard public security and 
national defence, and for the purposes of investigating criminal offences and 
unauthorised use of the electronic communications system), but also in situations 
“that may give rise to civil proceedings.”130 The Court arrived at this surprisingly 
broad interpretation of Article 15(1)
131
 by emphasising the express reference 
contained in that paragraph to Article 13(1) of the Data Protection Directive. This 
mentions further purposes for which Member States may restrict the right to privacy 
in respect of the processing of personal data, including where the restriction is 
necessary “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The Court 
concluded that, read in relation to Article 13(1) DPD, Article 15(1) PECD had to be 
interpreted “as expressing the Community legislature’s intention not to exclude from 
[its] scope the protection of the right to [intellectual] property or situations in which 
authors seek to obtain that protection in civil proceedings.”132 The question posed by 
the referring court was then answered by the Court’s ruling that although EU law does 
not require Member States to implement in their national laws an obligation to 
disclose personal data in the context of civil proceedings in order to ensure the 
effective protection of copyright, it does not preclude this either. What EU law does 
require, the Court went on, is that Member States transposing the relevant Directives 
in this area interpret them in a way “that allows a fair balance to be struck between the 
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order;” and that “when 
implementing the measures transposing those directives, the … courts of the Member 
States … not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those 
directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of them which 
would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general principles 
of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.”133 The Court offered no 
guidance as to how either legislatures or courts might fulfil these duties.  
 
In British Telecom, Parker J. seemed to broaden the reach of Promusicae beyond the 
decision actually taken on the reference, concluding that the DEA’s initial obligations 
regime – which will involve the processing of personal data outside the context of 
civil proceedings – is justified by Article 15(1) PECD simply because it is intended to 
promote the protection of copyright.
134
 Further, he failed to do what Promusicae 
required him to do: namely, first analyse whether the contested provisions of the DEA 
struck a fair balance between the fundamental rights in issue, and then ensure that his 
                                                 
130
 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU [2008] 2 CMLR 17, 
para. 52. Promusicae, a Spanish organisation of right-holders in sound recordings, had applied to a 
Spanish court for the equivalent of a Norwich Pharmacal order, requiring Telefónica, a Spanish IAP, to 
disclose the identities and physical addresses of subscribers who Promusicae claimed were infringing 
their copyrights, so that Promusicae could bring civil proceedings against these alleged infringers. The 
order was granted by the national court, but Telefónica appealed against that order, contending that 
there was no authority in the court under EU law to order the communication of the data sought in the 
context of civil proceedings or as a preliminary measure relating to civil proceedings. The national 
court referred that question to the ECJ. 
131
 Compare the Advocate General’s Opinion in Promusicae [2007] ECJ C-275/06 (indicating that all 
the grounds for derogation in Article 15 PECD concerned public security, and implying that an 
extension of these grounds to cover civil disputes would stretch the Directive’s language too far). 
132
 Promusicae v Telefónica (ECJ) para. 53 (emphasis added). 
133
 Ibid. paras. 68 and 70.  
134
 British Telecom paras. 165-6. 
Final version available in 2011 3(2) Journal of Media Law 305-47 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/jml                                                                                    
 
 28 
own interpretation of the relevant Directives did not conflict with those rights, or with 
the principle of proportionality. Parker J. did not analyse the implications for privacy 
of the contested provisions, although the right to privacy is clearly a fundamental right 
protected by the Community legal order. Meanwhile, he seemed to accept the 
Secretary of State’s view that copyright was also such a right, although this is 
controversial.
135
 The effect of the contested provisions on freedom of expression was 
noted – in particular, Parker J. accepted that there was some risk that the private 
policing by subscribers of the use of their Internet connections by others would have a 
chilling effect on legitimate Internet use – but pending the coming into effect of the 
initial obligations, it was in his view premature to conclude that any social costs 
thereby incurred would greatly outweigh the social benefits in terms of enhanced 
copyright protection.
136
 As to proportionality more generally, Parker J. adopted a 
highly deferential approach to the balance struck by Parliament in the short time that 
was available to it to consider the Digital Economy Bill. The contested provisions, he 
said, addressed “a major problem of social and economic policy, where important and 
conflicting interests [those of the nation and the copyright industries in curbing the 
economic damage caused by unlawful online activity, those of IAPs in minimising 
their responsibility for the material passing through their conduits, and those of 
Internet users in enjoying untrammeled access to online content] are in play.”137 This 
was an area firmly within the province of the legislative branch, not least because its 
complexity exposed the limits of the adjudicative process:  
 
Parliament struck the challenged balance after a lengthy process of 
consultation with all interested parties, which took account of the 
representations made by those parties, and after a voluntary, non-legislative 
scheme was tried out. That process is likely to have provided the decision 
maker with an insight and capacity that the court is unlikely to enjoy.
138
 
 
The contested provisions, Parker J. concluded, pursued the legitimate objective of 
protecting the ‘fundamental right’ to (intellectual) property, were necessary (because 
the hoped-for co-regulatory solution had failed to materialise) and had not been 
shown to be disproportionate – “in other words, that the legislator unlawfully failed to 
balance the relevant interests at stake.”139 As to the latter, it sufficed as far as Parker J. 
was concerned that the legislator had taken into account all the relevant interests: the 
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fact that errors may have been made in weighing how the legislation would serve 
these interests was irrelevant. Hence voluminous expert evidence questioning the 
reliability of the estimates on the basis of which the DEA’s anti-infringement strategy 
had been formulated – estimates of the impact of P2P file-sharing on the copyright 
industries, the likely impact of the new regime on the incidence of infringement, and 
the total social cost of the new regime – could be discounted, as it did not show that 
Parliament proceeded on the basis of irrational and unjustifiable assumptions.
140
 It 
was enough that there were reasons for believing that the new regime “may well have 
[a] positive effect”141 in curtailing online infringement.  
 
This decision will have done nothing to convince critics of the DEA’s online 
copyright infringement provisions of the legitimacy of the regulatory strategy 
embedded in it. Parker J.’s approach to the question of proportionality avoided any 
assessment of the substance of the legislative solution chosen to deal with the 
perceived problem of online copyright infringement, thereby revealing proportionality 
review to be somewhat toothless, in this area of policy at least.
142
 The judgment 
eschewed any assessment of whether other equally (or more) effective solutions to the 
perceived problem might have been chosen that were less apt to endanger Internet 
users’ privacy. It acknowledged the strategy’s propensity to trigger activities that 
could threaten freedom of expression, but declared the threat inchoate pending the 
Act’s full implementation. Finally, the ruling rests on the premise that the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the European legal order, far from constituting 
bulwarks against the diffuse forms of private regulation that will be triggered by the 
DEA, can be interpreted as justifying such regulation.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeal will find any challenges to this 
premise in the CJEU’s recent ruling in Scarlet v. SABAM. Here the European Court 
held that IAPs cannot be ordered by national courts to filter all of their subscribers’ 
electronic communications with a view to detecting and blocking files containing 
material that infringes copyright. Such an injunction, the Court unsurprisingly ruled, 
would require the IAP to carry out general monitoring in breach of Article 15 ECD. Yet the 
CJEU also insisted that the compatibility with EU law of measures designed to enable the 
more effective enforcement of copyrights depended more generally on the outcome of the 
balancing exercise required by Promusicae:  
 
[I]t follows from paragraph 68 of that judgment that, in the context of 
measures adopted to protect copyright holders, national authorities and courts 
must strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright and the 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such 
measures.
143
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In the view of the Court, an injunction of the form sought by SABAM (a music 
copyright collecting society) would have failed to strike a fair balance between the 
applicants’ copyrights on the one hand and the Charter rights of both the IAP and its 
customers on the other. The Court particularly noted the burdens the injunction would 
have imposed on the IAP’s freedom to conduct its business pursuant to Article 16 of 
the Charter (the IAP would have been required  to install a costly filtering/blocking 
system at its own expense), and on the rights of its customers to protection of their 
personal data pursuant to Article 8 (the system would have involved analysing activity 
linked to all of these customers’ IP addresses), and to receive and impart information 
pursuant to Article 11 (the system could have led to the blocking of their lawful 
communications). Clearly, the reporting and notification processes mobilised by the DEA’s 
initial obligations regime would be considerably less burdensome to the Charter rights and 
freedoms of IAPs and their customers than the injunction that SABAM sought to impose on 
the Belgian IAP, Scarlet. Nonetheless, the CJEU’s ruling entails that the Court of Appeal 
must now review the DEA in a way that gives these burdens a greater weight than that 
accorded them by Parker J in the High Court. 
 
Even if the Court of Appeal finds that the DEA’s initial obligations regime achieves a 
fair balance of all the relevant rights, the technical obligations regime would, if 
implemented, involve measures more directly analogous to those considered in 
Scarlet v. SABAM, and considerably more difficult to justify as consistent with EU 
law. This regime is the focus of the next Part.  
 
 
4 THE “TECHNICAL OBLIGATIONS”  
 
As indicated in Part 2.3 above, active consideration was being given in the UK, from 
at least the period of the MoU negotiations in 2007-2008 to the possibility of devising 
codes of practice defining when IAPs could be expected to deploy technical measures 
against subscribers to prevent their networks from being used for copyright-infringing 
purposes. Yet until the middle of 2009, there was no hint that the Government would 
legislate to require IAPs to introduce these measures: its thinking seemed to be that 
imposing the notification and listing obligations would be enough to reduce the level 
of online infringement through a combination of warnings/education and facilitating 
the pursuit of serious infringers through the courts. However, by the middle of 2009 
the Government was also proposing that OFCOM would be granted backstop powers 
to oblige IAPs to utilise technical measures against repeat infringers should these two 
obligations fail to reduce significantly the level of online infringement.
144
 The final 
Digital Britain report, published in June 2009, indicated that legislation would specify 
what these measures might be, and that they would include blocking; bandwidth 
capping (capping the speed of a subscriber’s Internet connection and/or capping the 
volume of data traffic which a subscriber could access); bandwidth shaping (limiting 
the speed of a subscriber’s access to selected protocols/services and/or capping the 
volume of data to selected protocols/services); and content identification and 
filtering.
145
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However the report clearly stated that these powers should only be able to be used if 
the notification/listing regime did not succeed in significantly reducing the level of 
unlawful file-sharing: a 70% reduction was identified as the target. According to the 
report, if that regime had produced no significant impact after 6 months, OFCOM 
should begin to take steps to prepare for the introduction of technical measures. If 
there was still no significant impact after 12 months, technical measures would be 
introduced.
146
 In June 2009, a consultation document was published inviting 
comments on these proposals.
147
 Like Digital Britain itself, the document contained 
no reference to any possibility of temporarily or permanently disconnecting 
subscribers. However before the deadline for commenting on the consultation paper 
had been reached, the Government suddenly added two new proposals.
148
 The first 
was that the Secretary of State be given powers to direct OFCOM to investigate 
whether technical measures should be required, and to direct OFCOM to require IAPs 
to impose these measures on subscribers. The second proposal was that disconnection 
of subscribers be added to the list of technical measures that OFCOM might require 
IAPs to impose on repeat infringers. Despite much public controversy, these revised 
proposals made their way into the Digital Economy Bill. 
 
Under new section 124F CA (inserted by section 8 DEA as enacted), OFCOM must, 
as soon as an initial obligations Code is in force, prepare quarterly and annual 
progress reports regarding copyright infringement by subscribers to internet access 
services. Section 124F(5), in listing the matters that these reports must address, is 
clearly designed to ensure that they enable the Secretary of State to monitor trends in 
online copyright infringement, ascertain the effectiveness of the two initial obligations 
in curbing it, and decide in the light of this evidence whether an obligation to impose 
technical measures should be introduced. Significantly, the subsection also ensures 
that the reports may serve to inform the Secretary of State as to whether right-holders 
have performed their side of the bargain purportedly underlying the introduction of 
the notification/listing regime: the reports must also describe and assess the steps 
taken by right-holders to (re-)educate the public about copyright and to enable 
subscribers to obtain lawful access to copyright works. The implication seems to be 
that the Secretary of State may decline to introduce an obligation on IAPs to impose 
technical measures if the persistence of mass online copyright infringement can be 
attributed in part to the copyright industries’ failure to contribute to a comprehensive 
solution to the problems that this causes for them. As was pointed out in one of the 
Government’s notes on the Bill, “[t]he ultimate aim of the legislation is to shift 
people’s behaviour from the unlawful to the legal,”149 not merely to curb unlawful 
behaviour. 
 
New section 124G CA (inserted by section 9 DEA) confers a power on the Secretary 
of State to direct OFCOM to assess whether IAPs should be obliged to take “technical 
measures” against “some or all relevant subscribers.” A technical measure is defined 
very broadly as “a measure that (a) limits the speed or other capacity of the service 
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provided to a subscriber; (b) prevents a subscriber from using the service to gain 
access to particular material, or limits such use; (c) suspends the service provided to a 
subscriber; or (d) limits the service provided to a subscriber in another way.”150 
OFCOM may also be directed to take steps to prepare for the imposition of these 
technical obligations – such steps may under section 124G(5) include carrying out a 
consultation, assessing the likely efficacy of particular technical measures, and 
preparing a technical obligations code – and report back on the assessment and/or 
steps.
151
 Nothing in section 124G as enacted requires the Secretary of State to await 
OFCOM’s reports on the functioning of the notification/listing regime before issuing 
any of these directions. 
 
New section 124H CA (inserted by section 10 DEA) gives the Secretary of State the 
power to impose a technical obligation on IAPs. Since “technical obligation” is 
defined as “an obligation … to take a technical measure” against subscribers,152 this 
power would seem also to be a power to specify those measures. The power can only 
be used if the initial obligations code has already been in force for at least 12 
months,
153
 so although preparatory steps towards introducing technical measures can 
be taken before the impact of the notification/listing regime is known, such measures 
can only actually be introduced after that regime has been in operation for at least a 
year. Further, the requirement that OFCOM must first have assessed whether 
technical obligations should be imposed, together with the requirement that the 
Secretary of State have regard both to these assessments and to OFCOM’s progress 
reports in deciding whether it is appropriate to impose technical obligations,
154
 seems 
in keeping with the original governmental aim that these should only be imposed if 
the notification/listing regime fails to reduce the level of online copyright 
infringement significantly. On the other hand, the Secretary of State can also have 
regard to “any other matter that appears to him to be relevant”155 in deciding whether 
to invoke the section 124H power, and the Government insisted during discussions of 
the Digital Economy Bill that the making of an assessment under section 124G was 
not intended to be a precondition for the power to make an order under section 124H:  
 
The Secretary of State needs to be able to make an order in the light of other 
considerations should the situation demand it. He needs to be able to take a 
broad view of the desirability of imposing a technical obligation. For example, 
the economic situation at the time might be something the Secretary of State 
might want to factor into the decision, or an assessment of potential 
unintended consequences of some measures on other policy areas.
156
  
 
For any period in which technical obligations are in force, a code ‘regulating’ them 
must also be in force;
157
 and new section 124I CA (inserted by section 11 DEA) 
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requires that OFCOM make this code. The procedural and substantive criteria 
governing its making, set out in sections 124I-J, are similar in many respects to those 
applicable to the making of an initial obligations code: the most notable difference is 
that a technical obligations code must not only provide for a first subscriber appeal,
158
 
but confer a further right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
159
  
 
There is however a major difference between the legislative mechanisms 
underpinning the notification/listing and technical measures regimes. Whereas the two 
initial obligations have been set out in primary legislation – notwithstanding that 
much detail remains to be supplied by an OFCOM code – the potentially far more 
burdensome technical obligations will be defined entirely by Ministerial order 
together with an OFCOM code. Beyond stating that the Secretary of State’s order may 
specify “the criteria for taking the technical measure concerned against a subscriber 
[and] the steps to be taken as part of the measure and when they are to be taken”160 
section 124H offers no guidance as to what form a technical obligations regime would 
take; and section 124G defines ‘technical measures’ in the vaguest possible terms. In 
specifying the technical obligations to be imposed on IAPs, any order under section 
124H would also specify the technical measures to be imposed on “some or all 
relevant subscribers.” It is clear that relevant subscribers will be (alleged) repeat 
infringers (subscribers eligible for inclusion in a copyright infringement list because 
linked with a sufficient number of CIRs); but it is not clear what would justify 
singling out ‘some’ of these for technical measures. As noted above, a technical 
measure could “suspend” a subscriber’s access to the Internet – and it is not entirely 
clear that this implies only temporary disconnection – while the catch-all provision 
enabling measures to be imposed that “limit the service provided to a subscriber in 
any other way” is exceedingly open-ended.  
 
Lord Mandelson, the Minister responsible for initiating the Digital Economy Bill, 
defended this ‘skeletal’ approach to the definition of the Secretary of State’s and 
OFCOM’s powers on the basis that technical matters, and details requiring adaptation 
and refinement over time, should not be included in primary legislation. However it 
has been argued by the Act’s many critics that the drafters have represented as mere 
technicalities or details matters which are in fact crucial to the operation of the 
envisaged copyright enforcement regime; and that failure to specify these matters in 
primary legislation has made it impossible to judge whether the new mechanisms it 
anticipates for curbing copyright infringement will be necessary or proportionate in 
relation to the legislation’s aim.161 What is certain, however, is that both the Secretary 
of State and OFCOM will now be obliged to have regard to the CJEU’s judgment in 
Scarlet v. SABAM (see 3.3 above) in making an order under section 124H and a code 
under section 124I. Both may be tempted to read that judgment narrowly – as 
precluding only the imposition of obligations on IAPs to engage in indiscriminate 
filtering of the electronic communications of all of its subscribers, entirely at their 
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own expense and for an unlimited period of time – and so as having no particular 
implications for the DEA’s technical obligations regime. Yet there remains a 
significant risk that, if it becomes operational, that regime – albeit targeted at 
subscribers presumed to be repeat infringers, and partly funded by right-holders – will 
fail to balance relevant Charter rights in the manner required by the CJEU, and for 
this and other reasons fall foul of EU law; and that it will be widely perceived by 
Internet users as compromising their rights in particular, while also failing to reduce 
online copyright infringement significantly.  
 
First of all, if invoked, the section 124H power would enable new sanctions to be 
imposed on subscribers in a way that would clearly engage Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the 
Charter (dealing respectively with the right to respect for one’s private life and 
communications, to the protection of one’s personal data, and to freedom of 
expression). If imposed, such sanctions would not only affect unlawful (albeit private 
and/or communicative) activities, but would also inevitably affect lawful activities, 
and thereby interfere with the ability of the subscriber and members of his/her 
household sharing the service to engage in work, education and the use of e-
government services. Further, the sanctions would be imposed by IAPs, at the behest 
of copyright owners, and could be imposed without the prior involvement of a court 
or administrative authority; and this in turn would raise questions about the 
compatibility of the technical obligations regime with the Framework Directive. The 
subscriber would be able to bring an appeal to the independent appeals body, and 
from there to the First-tier Tribunal, before imposition; but should s/he not appeal 
within the specified timeframe, his/her Internet service could conceivably be curtailed 
by the IAP on the basis of unchallenged evidence submitted to the IAP by a right-
holder. It is difficult to see how such a process could be the ‘prior fair and impartial 
procedure’ required by Article 1.3(a) of the Framework Directive.  
 
Second, given the ease with which a determined computer cracker can break into even 
encrypted networks, the prospect cannot be discounted that technical measures will be 
imposed on large numbers of subscribers who will not in fact have infringed 
copyright at all. At the same time, subscribers who do engage in large-scale 
infringement – the very subscribers the regime aims to control – are highly likely to 
find ways to avoid the reach of technical measures entirely.
162
 In short, 
implementation of the technical obligations regime risks provoking widespread 
allegations of unfairness, bias and lack of accountability on the part of the regime’s 
main agents: the Secretary of State, OFCOM, right-holders, and IAPs. Intense critical 
scrutiny of the regime’s efficacy would inevitably ensue, and this in turn would raise 
questions about whether the DEA creates new ‘externalities’ of its own: negative 
social consequences of copyright enforcement measures that are not paid for either by 
copyright owners, or by infringers. The UK Government has not so far seen fit to 
monetise the cost of any of these possible costs of implementing the DEA.
163
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Nonetheless, as the next Part explains, its strategy for distributing the costs that it has 
measured is particularly revealing of the regulatory strategy embedded in the DEA 
 
 
5 COSTS, AND COST-SHARING 
 
The Labour Government’s initial thinking had been that right-holders and IAPs 
should bear an equal share of the expenditure incurred by IAPs in complying with 
their new obligations,
164
 an arrangement broadly acceptable to right-holders. 
However, by January 2010 – doubtless under pressure from the ISP industry, which 
has consistently maintained that right-holders should cover all of the IAPs’ costs – the 
then Business Secretary Lord Mandelson was indicating that right-holders would bear 
the ‘largest part’165 of these costs. This shift in position was reflected in the Labour 
Government’s consultation paper of March 2010 on the cost-sharing issue,166 which 
proposed that the cost to IAPs of processing CIRs, maintaining CILs and issuing 
notifications to subscribers be split roughly in the ratio 75:25 between right-holders 
and IAPs. The coalition Government decided to take forward this proposal, and to 
split not only these ‘notification fees’, but also the ‘qualifying costs’ (i.e. the costs 
incurred by OFCOM) and the ‘case fees’ (the costs incurred by the appeals body in 
dealing with subscriber appeals), in the same way.
167
 It eventually finalised a first 
draft cost-sharing Order in September 2010, which, as required by Article 8(1) of the 
Technical Standards Directive, was notified to the European Commission.  
 
However, the Commission questioned whether the imposition of qualifying costs and 
case fees on ISPs was compatible with Article 12(1) of the Authorisation Directive 
(AD).
168
 Shortly thereafter Parker J. handed down his decision in British Telecom. 
The one ground on which he found in favour of the claimants concerned the 
compatibility of the draft cost-sharing Order with Article 12 AD. He held that 
qualifying costs (though not notification fees or case fees) would constitute 
“administrative charges” imposed on undertakings providing a network or service 
under the general authorisation, and that since these did not relate to any of the 
matters specified in Article 12, they would be unlawful.
169
 Subsequently, OFCOM 
was asked to advise on options for reducing the cost of the appeals process. In the 
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light of that advice,
170
 the DCMS concluded in August 2011 that appellants should be 
required to pay a fee of £20 (refundable in the event of a successful appeal) in order to 
minimise the risk of the system being disrupted by “vexatious or non bona fide 
appeals.”171 A second draft of the Online Infringement of Copyright (Initial 
Obligations)(Sharing of Costs) Order, re-written to reflect these developments,
172
 has 
been re-notified under the TSD and is now expected to be laid before Parliament early 
in 2012. In the event of technical measures being introduced, the costs associated with 
these will be the subject of a separate consultation and Order. 
 
It is the cost-sharing arrangements that most clearly reveal the de-centred regulatory 
strategy that underlies the online copyright infringement provisions of the DEA. To a 
copyright lawyer, accustomed to seeing copyright as a regime of private law, these 
arrangements will seem highly unusual: effectively, IAPs – who are third parties to 
any legal dispute between copyright owners and their subscribers – will be required to 
contribute to the cost of enforcing the former’s private rights. Right-holders have 
relied on a range of arguments in support of this apparent anomaly. They point to 
profits allegedly lost due to file-sharing, and to the heavy investments they are already 
making in detecting these. They also claim that IAPs have indirectly benefited from 
the infringement possibilities Internet access offers, because these have increased 
demand for their services and enabled higher charges to be levied on file-sharing 
customers on the basis that they consume more bandwidth than other users. In 
addition they argue that IAPs will now benefit from controlling file-sharing because 
high bandwidth consumption slows data traffic through IAPs’ networks, thereby 
threatening the efficiency of these networks; and that if IAPs were reimbursed in full 
for their costs they would have no incentive to minimise these costs and could even 
seek to inflate them. IAPs, meanwhile, have insisted that the Internet and those who 
provide access to it cannot be held responsible for increased copyright infringement, 
and that the finger of blame should be pointed instead at P2P software developers and 
sites that actively promote copyright infringement through file-sharing. The new 
enforcement framework, they argue, will only benefit right-holders, and passing the 
immediate costs of operationalising it on to right-holders would ensure that both its 
costs and its benefits are more fully taken into account and that the most efficient 
arrangements emerge.
173
 It has also been suggested that IAPs will simply pass on their 
costs in the form of higher broadband charges for their subscribers, which could 
further widen the digital divide if lower-income users discontinue broadband or elect 
not to subscribe.  
 
The view taken by both the Labour and the coalition Governments has been that 
making IAPs bear some of the costs would not only incentivise them to comply 
                                                 
170
 OFCOM, “Digital Economy Act Online Copyright Infringement Appeals Process: Options for 
Reducing Costs” (3 August 2011). 
171
 DCMS, “Next Steps for Implementation of the Digital Economy Act” p.6. Under section 
124M(2)(c) CA, the Secretary of State has the power to specify in the cost-sharing Order the fees, if 
any, that are payable by subscribers in respect of subscriber appeals. The Government took the view 
that a no-fee regime might find itself the target of an orchestrated campaign by those opposed to the 
measures, and that a large volume of such ‘protest’ appeals could drive up the cost of the appeals 
process to the point where it became unworkable. 
172
 Available at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/publications/8365.aspx. 
173
Mott McDonald Group, “P2P Report” (February 2010) pp.18-20, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100511084737/interactive.bis.gov.uk/digitalbritain.  
Final version available in 2011 3(2) Journal of Media Law 305-47 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/jml                                                                                    
 
 37 
efficiently with their notification and listing obligations, but also to act voluntarily to 
reduce online copyright infringement (thereby reducing the number of notifications 
they might have to process) and to enter into joint ventures with copyright owners to 
provide access to lawful content “under which a bilateral agreement could reduce the 
numbers of notifications they receive.”174 To this extent, the cost-sharing element of 
the new system is absolutely integral to what is arguably the overall goal of sections 
3-16: to prompt (while not directly commanding) the emergence of new online 
business models for lawful content, and a degree of vertical integration between 
content providers and Internet access providers. 
 
  
6 CONCLUSION 
 
Although self-regulation and co-regulation (in the senses outlined in Part 2.1 above) 
were originally favoured by the UK Government as ways of managing the 
phenomenon of online copyright infringement, neither the initial obligations regime 
nor the technical obligations regime envisaged by sections 3-16 DEA could be 
described as either self- or co-regulatory: between them, the Secretary of State and 
OFCOM are to formulate every detail of each regime. Yet mechanisms of regulatory 
intervention are nonetheless bound to be highly fragmented in the practical operation 
of the DEA, with copyright owners, IAPs, and even subscribers themselves (along 
with ICT security firms purveying encryption, tracking and related products and 
services) all having some role to play. This fragmentation is inevitable given the 
grand ambition that appears to underlie this legislation: to trigger new patterns of 
interaction between content providers, IAPs and consumers that will ultimately 
restructure the market for digitised cultural content. However, there are evident 
difficulties associated with ‘outsourcing’ regulation in this manner, particularly where 
cyberspace is concerned. Not the least of these is ensuring that all the envisaged 
participants have read the script and can be counted on to play their assigned parts. 
There are clear signs that at least some of the large IAPs – whose informational 
resources, strategic position vis-à-vis end-users, organisational capacities and 
technical facilities would be crucial to the DEA’s successful implementation – will 
strenuously resist being enrolled as the copyright industries’ private police force. The 
main motivations prompting the two largest UK IAPs to seek judicial review of the 
DEA were that it would impose disproportionate costs on them – not only a share of 
its quantifiable operating costs, but other costs incurred through loss of custom and 
damage to goodwill. They anticipate these losses because many Internet users 
experience the Intenet not primarily as the locus of failure-prone information markets 
that deserve legal support on economic grounds, but as a site of cultural development 
and identity-formation in which the integrity of communication takes priority over the 
imperatives of commerce. These users will certainly resist any curtailment of 
freedoms that have not only become habitual, but are increasingly coming to be 
regarded as grounded in individual rights. Resistance could involve circumventing the 
measures applied by IAPs,
175
 deluging IAPs with complaints, or migrating to other 
IAPs that are not obliged to apply the measures. And while such reactions are indeed 
likely to involve monetary losses for IAPs, their organisational cultures may in any 
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case incline IAPs to sympathise with their subscribers’ grievances – after all, 
TalkTalk’s ‘Don’t Disconnect Us’ campaign against the Digital Economy Bill was 
run entirely on the basis that it threatened Internet users’ civil liberties.  
 
End-users’ values and reactions are not only likely to inform IAPs’ approach to the 
new regime: the cultural industries cannot afford to ignore them either, and for at least 
two reasons. First, many Internet users are highly tech-savvy, and previous experience 
with DRM shows that there are few, if any, restrictions on Internet use that cannot 
sooner or later be broken through or routed around. Second, at the heart of the cultural 
industries’ operations lies an ineradicable contradiction: their profitability depends on, 
even as it is undermined by, unrestricted access to and enjoyment of cultural 
commodities. On one hand, the value of a cultural commodity depends on the size of 
its audience, because the bigger the audience the greater the ‘buzz’ that in turn 
produces hits and stars. So it is that a senior executive of one of the ‘big four’ global 
music corporations can assert that “our vision is music availability everywhere, at any 
time and in any place.”176 On the other hand, audiences take shape in the exercise of 
freedoms to experience cultural commodities and communicate (through) them, 
freedoms that are impossible for the industries fully to manage or monetise but which 
only exist as freedoms in so far as they are not fully manageable or monetisable. 
Because of the nature of digital technology, every use and transmission of a cultural 
commodity online can involve taking and re-circulating intellectual property, and so 
eat directly into profits unless controlled and metered – hence the current concerns 
about mass online copyright infringement. Yet once the unfettered use and 
transmission of cultural commodities is seen for what it is – as an inevitable adjunct 
of cultural consumption in the digital networked environment – it becomes clear that 
the cultural industries eradicate it at their peril.  
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